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THE EXPATRIATION ACT OF 1954
THE Expatriation Act of 1954 ' is the newest addition to the growing list
of statutes by which Congress has sought to equip the government with sanc-
tions to combat internal communism.2 The Act defines no new crimes, but
provides for the automatic loss of United States nationality 3 by persons con-
victed of certain existing crimes, including rebellion and insurrection, seditious
conspiracy, and advocating the overthrow of the government in the manner
proscribed by the Smith Act.4 Since a court has recently held that member-
ship in the Communist Party, along with cognizance of its subversive aims,
is sufficient in itself to constitute a violation of the Smith Act,6 the Expatria-
1. Expatriation Act of 1954, 68 STAT. 1146, Pub. L. No. 772, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
(Sept. 3, 1954).
The Expatriation Act amended § 349(a) (9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
to read:
"(a) a person who is a national of the United States whether by birth or
naturalization, shall lose his nationality by
"(9) committing any act of treason against, or attempting by force to over-
throw, or bearing arms against the United States, violating or conspiring to violate
any of the provisions of section 2383 of title 18, United States Code, or wilfully
performing any act in violation of section 2385 of title 18, United States Code, or
violating section 2384 of said title by engaging in a conspiracy to overthrow, plt
down, or to destroy by force tre Government of the United States, or to levy war
against them, if and when he is convicted thereof by a court martial or by a court
of competent jurisdiction . .. ."
66 STAT. 268 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1481(a) (9) (Supp. 1954). (Portions
added by the Expatriation Act are italicized.)
2. E.g., Communist Control Act of 1954, 68 STAT. 775, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 841-44 (Supp.
1954) ; Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 STAT. 987, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-826 (1952) ; 68 STAT.
745 (1954), 18 U.S.C.A. § 3486 (Supp. 1954) (witnesses; immunity from prosecution) ;
Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 STAT. 166, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1952), especially §§ 1182,
1251, 1252.
The views of President Eisenhower, expressed in his State of the Union message of
January 7, 1954, were highly influential in bringing about the passage of the Expatriation
Act. See 100 CONG. REc. 80 (1954).
3. The terms "citizenship" and "nationality" will be used interchangeably throughout
this Comment.
On the meaning of citizenship and nationality see, generally, GETTYs, CITIZzNSIxr IN
THE UNITED STATES (1934); HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LAw c. 4 (3d ed. 1951); MAXON,
CITIZENSHIP (1930); 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 293-96a (7th ed., Lauter-
pacht 1948) ; Nielsen, Some Vexatious Questions Relating to Nationality, 20 CoLUM. L.
REv. 840 (1920).
4. These acts are defined as crimes by 18 U.S.C. §§ 2383-85 (1952) respectively.
5. United States v. Lightfoot, Criminal No. 54-CR-262, N.D. Ill., Jan. 26, 1955.
See N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1955, p. 1, col. 2; Feb. 16, 1955, p. 15, col. 6. All previous con-
victions of communists had been under that section of the Smith Act which prohibits
conspiracy to teach or advocate the overthrow of the government. N.Y. Times, Jail. 27,
1955, p. 1, col. 2. Since the decision in Lightfoot, the government has indicted three
more communist leaders on membership grounds.
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tion Act is potentially applicable to more than 22,000 American communists.0
But a decision that the Expatriation Act is constitutional might well affect
more than these 22,000 unpopular citizens: it would probably establish the
proposition that expatriation may validly be imposed as punishment for crime.-
Deprivation of all the rights of citizenship within the United States-includ-
ing the right to remain in it-and the rights of nationality abroad, could then
become a standard feature of federal criminal law.
Deprivation of American nationality has been used before by the United
States as a sanction against criminal conduct,8 but the constitutionality of such
provisions has never been tested or even satisfactorily discussed.0 Moreover,
decisions on the constitutional status of expatriation in general have been few,
and have encumbered the law with an imprecise and unrealistic terminology
that leaves obscure the extent of congressional power over citizenship in any
context. There is, therefore, not even a settled body of law from which to
proceed by way of reason and analogy. The commentator must state the cases,
speculate as to their meaning, and take his stand on policy.
6. Testiuwny of J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before
the House Subcommittee on Appropriations on February, 24, 1955, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in U.S. Dp'T OF JusTic, FxDERAT BuRENL oF IvzmsTxorboNz, 1956 APrno-
PRIAuTo 51 (1955).
7. See text at notes 100, 111-23 infra and accompanying text.
S. In 1940 loss of nationality wras made a consequence of conviction of treason, deser-
tion or attempted overthrow of the government by force. 54 STAT. 1168 (1940), 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1481(a) (8), (9) (1952). In 1944 draft avoidance in time of war was added to the list
of expatriating crimes. 58 STAT. 746 (1944), S U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (10) (1952). See also
13 STAT. 501 (1865) (deprivation of the "rights of citizenship" for desertion or draft
evasion). For a discussion of the use of denationalization as a penal sanction, see text
at notes 76-99 infra.
9. The dearth of reported court cases involving penal expatriation is surprising, since
over 2% of all persons expatriated between 1945 and 1953 lost their citizenship on such
grounds. Of 47,011 persons expatriated during that period, 1281 lost their nationality
because of draft avoidance, 11 because of desertion, and 146 on other grounds. No persons
were expatriated for treason or conviction of conspiracy to overthrow the government
by force and violence. See I. & N. ANN. REP. 67 (1953); id. 73 (1951); statistical
summary for the years 1945 to 1949 included with Letter from L Paul Winings, General
Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service, to the Yale Law Journal, April 1, 1955,
on file in Yale Law Library. See also Krichefsky, Loss of United States Natiorality:
Expatriation, 4 Imm. AND NAT. Mo. REXv. 9 (1946).
The Supreme Court did have occasion to state that no citizenship "rights" could be
denied under the 1865 Act, see note 8 supra, until the accused had been convicted by a mili-
tary court martial, but it did not discuss constitutional problems. Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115
U.S. 487, 501 (1885). Only one modern case has been found in which the penal sections
of the expatriation statutes were involved. Ponce v. McGrath, 91 F. Supp. 23 (S.D. Cal.
1950). A few other cases on penal expatriation have been heard by the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals, e.g., In Matter of H-VP--448327, 4 I. & N. Dc. 540 (1952) (deser-
tion); In Matter of G-R-A-6732816, 3 1. & N. DEc. 141 (1948) (draft avoidance);
In Matter of C-56175145, 2 I. & N. Dc. 276 (1945) (desertion), but neither the
district court nor the Board have reached constitutional questions. See also Citizenship
Status of Grover Cleveland Bergdoll, 39 Ops. A-r'v Gnrm. 303 (1939) (convicted
deserter).
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WHAT THE EXPATRIATION AcT DOES
Upon conviction of any of the crimes it specifies, the Expatriation Act
operates automatically to divest American nationality: it transfers the individ-
ual affected from the legal category of "citizen," or "national," to that of "non-
citizen," or "alien."' 0 The shift from one legal category to another-to the
extent that it may constitutionally be accomplished-amounts to a loss of those
rights under federal and state statutes and constitutions, and tinder interna-
tional law, which are enjoyed by the citizen but not by the stateless alien.1
Wrhile the rights of aliens under the Federal Constitution are substantial,
10. 66 STAT. 272, 8 U.S.C. § 1488 (1952). See note 1 supra; S. REP. No. 2198, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1954). See also Note, Federal Anti-Subversive Legislation of 1954, 55
COLUM. L. REv. 631, 664 n.247 (1955). Actual deprivations such as deportation, or loss or
denial of employment, are not directly imposed by the Expatriation Act. These depriva-
tions must be accomplished by operation of other statutes or constitutional provisions. The
Act purports only to extinguish defenses against such deprivations should they ever be
attempted.
Section 101 (a) (3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act defines the term "alien" as
"any person not a citizen or national of the United States." 66 STAT. 166, 8 U.S.C. § 1101
(a) (3) (1952).
Some question may arise whether the Expatriation Act brings individuals subject to
its operation within the purview of statutes applicable to "aliens." For while Congress
unquestionably intended to impose alien status, see, e.g., 100 CONG. REc. 11281 (1954) (Reps.
Graham and Robsion); id. at 14981 (Sen. Watkins) ; Roche, The Loss of Nationality,
99 U. PA. L. Rav. 25, 38-40 (1950), it did so by imposing loss of "nationality." See notes 1,
2 supra. And since the term "alien" generally connotes "foreigner" in constitutional
practice, see notes 138, 144-45 infra, it may be urged that expatriated native Americans
are "non-citizens" rather than "aliens." They would thus have no recourse to the privileges
granted exclusively to citizens, but would nevertheless not be subject to the constitutional
disabilities of "aliens." Such an interpretation would alter or avoid the most serious constitu-
tional problems posed by the Act, see note 18 infra, and the possibility of its adoption cannot
be wholly discounted. Cf. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948); Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (concurring opinion of Justice
Brandeis) ; SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONsmucrioN § 83 (3d ed., Lewis 1904). However,
since Congress clearly intended to impose alien status, it is assumed hereafter that the
statute will be held to accomplish that result.
11. On the status of aliens in the United States, see, generally, KoNviTz, Tus ALE
AND ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW (1946) ; Comment, The Alien and the Constitution, 20
U. CI. L. REV. 547 (1953) ; Kohler, Legal Disabilities of Aliens in the United States, 16
A.B.A.J. 113 (1930). For discussion of the status of aliens under international law, see
BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (1916) ; HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL
LAW c. 11 (3d ed. 1951).
On the meaning of statelessness, see ARENDr, THE ORIGINS Or TOTALITARIANISM 266-
98 (1951) ; 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 308-313a (7th ed., Lauterpacht 1948).
In the event the convicted American were a dual national he would not, of course, be
rendered stateless by the loss of his United States citizenship. For a discussion of the
different methods by which citizenship is obtained with special reference to dual national-
ity, see Flournoy, Dual Nationality and Election, 30 YALE L.J. 545, 693 (1921);
Naujoks, Power of the National State in International Law to Determine the Nationality
of an Individual, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 451 (1932), 7 id. 176, 182-85 (1933).
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they are inferior in important respects to those of the citizen.- Thus, aliens
do not enjoy the "privileges and immunities" of federal citizenship secured by
article four of the Constitution and by the fourteenth amendment.13 Perhaps
more important is the fact that aliens receive diminished protection under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth and the due process clauses of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments. 14 Both federal and state governments may
discriminate against aliens without violating those constitutional provisions.
While the more severe economic deprivations have been increasingly disfavored
by the courts in recent years, they are still countenanced when they meet a
standard centered about the reasonableness of the discrimination made be-
tveen citizen and alien. 15 Thus, legislation currently in effect in many states
excludes aliens from employment, housing, land ownership, admission into
professions, and voting.1 Also, the alien receives less protection under the
Federal Civil Rights Act, part of which applies only to citizens.'-
12. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586 & nn.9-10 (1952) ; Klapprott
v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 616, 617 (1949) (concurrence of Justices Rutledge and
Murphy); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 157, 160 (1945) (concurrence of Justice
Murphy). See also authorities cited note 11 supra; BORCHADa, DwLw0Asic Pro=croN
OF CITIzEns ABRO.A 63 (1916).
13. These rights have been held to include, among others, the right to demand the
protection of the federal government at sea and abroad, to become a citizen of any
state by bona fide residence therein, to have free access to the seaports and navigable
waters of the United States, to travel from state to state; and the right "to come to the
seat of the government, to assert any claim he may have upon [it], ... to transact any
business he may have with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in ad-
ministering its functions." Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79-S0 (1872) ;
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, No. 3230 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). On the right tu
travel from state to state see Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 ANall.) 35, 43, 4S (1867).
14. Certain discriminations against aliens are permitted despite the fact that the fifth
and fourteenth amendments are not limited in their application to citizens, but apply
generally to all "persons." For discussion of permissible distinctions and citation of
pertinent cases see Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) ; Oyama
v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) ; KonvxTz, op. cit. supra ote 11, at 46-219; Comment,
20 U. Cm. L. Rav. 547 (1953).
15. See, e.g., cases cited note 14 supra; Comment, 20 U. CHi. L Rrx. 547, 566 (1953)
(reasonable discrimination permitted).
16. KoN'rz, op. cit. smpra note 11, at cc. 1-10, treats all aspects of the status of
aliens in the United States and cites landmark cases and articles in the field. See cm. 6-7
for restrictions on the alien's right to employment and to enter into the professions; c. 5
on land ownership with its resulting limitation on the availability of adequate housing.
States which limit the right to own land to citizens or persons eligible for citizenship are
listed in 5 VaNirx , A.'NERICAN FAm.my LAWS §§ 288-92 (1938). For further discussion
of the right of aliens to own land, see 5 TrAY, REA. PRopzary § 1377 (3d ed. 1939).
Limitation of alien suffrage is discussed in Konvrz, op. cit. mspra, at 1; Aylsworth, The
Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 Ams. PoT- Sc. Ray. 114 (1931). Furthermore, restricted
job opportunities result from federal legislation such as the Federal Maritime Act, 1 STAT.
287 (1792), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 221 (1952) ; 49 STAT. 1935 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 672a
(1952). Under this Act, seventy-five per cent of the crew of each American vessel must
be United States citizens unless a special permit is issued by the Secretary of the Treasury.
Ibid.
17. 16 STAT. 144 (1870), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1952) ; 14 STAT. 27 (1866), 42 U.S.C.
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By far the most important right which the Expatriation Act attempts to take
from the citizen is the right to remain in the United States. Aliens, unlike
citizens, are subject to the plenary congressional power of deportation.1" This
vulnerability to deportation undercuts the inviolability of all rights nominally
granted to the alien, since Congress may make the free exercise of any of those
rights a cause for deportation.10 Furthermore, when deportation of the alien
is sought, he enjoys only very limited procedural rights.2 0 While he is guaran-
teed a fair hearing and procedural due process on the issue of his deport-
§ 1982 (1952); 17 STAT. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952). Sections 1981 and 1983
preserve certain rights for all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States. How-
ever, § 1982 guarantees only to citizens the right to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real estate and personal property.
18. "The interest which an alien has in continued residence in this country is pro-
tected only so far as Congress may choose to protect it; Congress may direct that all
shall go back, or that some shall go back and some may stay; and it may distinguish
between the two by such tests as it thinks appropriate." Judge Learned Hand, in United
States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 489, 490 (2d Cir. 1950). See also
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893) ; KONvITz, op. cit. supra note 11, at 46-78; cf. I OPPENHEIt, INTERNATIONAL LAW
§§ 323-26 (7th ed., Lauterpacht 1948).
The sponsors of the Expatriation Act in both houses of Congress emphasized that
the Act would make citizens deportable. See, e.g., 100 CoNG. REc. 14981 (1954) (Sen.
Watkins) ; id. at 11281 (Rep. Robsion). Representative Graham stated that an expatriate
"would not per se become deportable unless such person, following the loss of United
States nationality, brings himself within the purview of [the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 66 STAT. 163, 204, 208, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1252 (1952)] ....." 100 Cox(. REc. 11281
(1954). See, however, Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (retroactive
deportation statute constitutional) ; United States ex re. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338
U.S. 521 (1950) (denaturalized citizen deportable for acts done while a citizen, without
regard to the "void ab initio" doctrine). For statutory obstacles to the deportation of
expatriates under existing law, see note 137 infra.
The holding that expatriates are made "non-citizens," as distinguished from "aliens," by
the Expatriation Act, see note 10 supra, could shift the ground for constitutional argument
in a deportation proceeding. The Immigration and Nationality Act defines "alien" as
"any person not a citizen or national of the United States." 66 STAT. 166, 8 U.S.C. § 1101
(a) (3) (1952). This definition would be attacked as an unreasonable classification denying
equal protection of the laws. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942) ; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). For authorities indicating that
the term "alien" has always had a factual reference, i.e., a person born outside the United
States, see notes 138, 144-45 infra.
19. Aliens remain in the United States only so long as their presence is not deemed
hurtful. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 280 (1922); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228
U.S. 585, 591 (1913) ; Moncado v. Ramsey, 167 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1948). Even conduct
protected by the first amendment, for example, may be the cause for an alien's deporta-
tion. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Note, 51 YAmn L.J. 1215, 1222
(1942). But cf. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
20. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) ; cf. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). For general discussion of the alien's limited constitutional
rights when facing deportation, see Note, 60 YALE L.J. 152 (1951).
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ability, he has no claim to a jury trial on that question.2' Moreover, since
deportation is a civil sanction, many other rights normally granted to a criminal
defendant are denied the alien.Y Thus, the alien may be compelled to testify
against himself.23 He may not complain of illegal searches or seizures carried
out by the government..2 4 Nor may he argue that deportation is unconstitutional
as a cruel and unusual punishment.25 Finally, the alien may be held without
bail in the sole discretion of the Attorney General pending an administrative
determination of his deportability.2-0 In the event he is found deportable, this
detention may continue for up to six months, if necessary, until his departure
can be arranged.
2 7
Unless the American subject to the Expatriation Act is a dual national, loss
of nationality amounts to the loss of all rights under contemporary inter-
national law. States are traditionally considered to be the sole right and duty
bearing units under international law; the individual's rights and duties derive
from his connection with a State.28 Protests by individual States or by the
21. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (fair hearing and due process) ; Carlson
v. Landon. supra note 20, at 537 & n.28 (no right to a jury trial).
22. Carlson -. Landon, sipra note 21; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580
(1952) ; Bridges v. Vixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1923).
But see Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951). See, generally, Note, 60 Y,%LE LJ.
152 & n.2 (1951), and cases cited therein.
23. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923); United States ex rel. Circella v.
Sahl, 216 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1954).
24. Li Sing -. United States, 180 U.S. 4806, 495 (1901); Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 236 (1896); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 693, 730
(1893). But see Bilokumsky v. Tod, supra note 23. In the Fong Yue Ting case the
Supreme Court stated that an alien who has been ordered deported "has not . . . been
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; and the provisions
of the Constitution, securing the right of trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures, and cruel and unusual punishments, have no applicatioL" Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, supra.
25. Wong Wing v. United States, supra note 24; Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
supra note 24; accord, Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 617 (1949) (concur-
rences of Justices Rutledge and Murphy).
26. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (Attorney General's "reasonable"
apprehension of "hurt" to United States from release of prisoner sufficient grounds for
refusal of bail).
27. 66 STAT. 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1952). The deportee regains only a portion
of his freedom when released at the end of six months, since he remains under supervised
parole. While no attempt is presently made to imprison undeportable deportees in-
definitely, precedent for such action may exist Thus, in Shaughnessy v. United States
ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), the Court upheld the continued detention without
bail of an entering alien who was undeportable because no nation would accept him. The
Court has often equated the government's exclusionary power with the power of expul-
sion, although resident aliens facing deportation are guaranteed a greater measure of
procedural due process than are entering aliens. Id. at 210-13. Such distinctions might
not prevent the permanent detention of alien residents ordered deported and unable to
comply.
28. 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 291-94 (7th ed., Lauterpacit 1948).
See notes 158-72 infra.
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United Nations against outrages involving stateless persons are likely to be
met successfully with the defense of "domestic jurisdiction." 29 A stateless
person, having no parent State to make representations or take action in his
behalf, is almost entirely at the mercy of the State in which he resides.80
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EXPATRIATION ACT
The Expatriation Act of 1954 amends section 349 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, which is entitled: "Loss of nationality by native-born or
naturalized citizen; voluntary action.""' By choosing this section for amend-
ment, Congress attempted to suggest the legal conclusion that the Act did no
more than recognize a new method for voluntary expatriation. 82 Viewed as
Congress suggests, loss of nationality would follow conviction of a subversive
crime not as a penalty, but rather as a result of the prior statutory definition of
the crime as an act of expatriation.38 No inquiry would be made as to whether
the citizen actually desired to give up his nationality.3 4 Conviction of perform-
ance of the act would furnish conclusive proof that he chose voluntarily to
renounce his citizenship. 3
If the Expatriation Act of 1954 is considered to be no more than creation
by Congress of an additional method by which a citizen can exercise his right
29. See note 165 infra.
30. For detailed discussion of the plight of the stateless individual under interna-
tional law see notes 139-43 infra and accompanying text.
When a nation maltreats the citizens of a foreign State who are inside its borders,
the parent State may complain and in time obtain damages in behalf of the injured
person. See, e.g., United States (Chattin) v. Mexico, U.S.-Mexico Gen. Claims Comm'n
Opinions 422 (1927); FRExMAN, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATEs FOR DENIAL
OF JusncE passim (1938). The stateless person is unable to claim such protection and
consequently may be the subject of more frequent discrimination and maltreatment by
the State in which he resides. See BORCHARD, DImLomtArIc PRoT'CrON OF CITIZENS
ABROAD § 8 (1916) ; 1 OPPENHEIM, Op. cit. supra note 28, §§ 291-92, 312.
31. See note 1 supra.
32. In a statement made before the House, Representative Graham referred to the
Act's operation as similar to "voluntary renunciation." 100 CoNG. REc. 11280 (1954).
Senator Watkins of Utah told the Senate that the commission and conviction of the crimes
defined in H.R. 7130 amounted to "an overt act of expatriation . . . tantamount to the
transfer of allegiance to [a] foreign power." 100 Coxca. Rc. 14981 (1954). See note
2 mpra.
The denationalization of convicted subversives could have been accomplished by an
amendment to the anti-sedition statutes or the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2383-2385 (1952),
adding loss of nationality to the penalties already prescribed. See text at notes 3-4 supra.
However, such action would have denied the proponents of denationalization their best
argument for the constitutionality of the sanction, an argument based on the voluntary
expatriation doctrine. See text at notes 45-64 infra. During the course of debate Senator
McCarran stated that he had serious doubts "about the constitutional right of Congress
to deprive a man of his citizenship as a criminal penalty." 100 CONG. REc. 14983 (1954).
33. See note 39infra.
34. See, e.g., Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950) ; Revedin v. Acheson,
194 F.2d 482, 484 (2d Cir. 1952).
35. For judicial recognition of a presumption of voluntariness, see Savorgnan v.
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to expatriate himself voluntarily, no constitutional problems can arise. Deter-
minxon of whether Congress has succeeded in so avoiding constitutional
prcolems must await consideration of the development and present status of
tfi concept of voluntary expatriation, which has been the central pivot of ex-
,atriation law in the United States from the beginning.
History of Volintary Expatriation
At its inception, the doctrine of voluntary expatriation was permissive rather
than restrictive and required the exercise of no governmental powers. Moti-
vated by the desire to free recently naturalized Americans from claims to
allegiance advanced by states from which they had emigrated, Congress in 1868
recognized voluntary expatriation as a "natural and inherent right of all
people."3 6 The Act of 1868 declared the willingness of the United States to
permit its nationals to renounce American citizenship, and served notice that
it would unalterably oppose governmental interference with any individual's
right to change his nationality.
3 7
Beginning in 1907 with the first expatriation statute and continuing to date,as
voluntary expatriation has taken on a markedly different meaning. In various
United States, supra note 34; Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915) ; Acheson V. Wohl-
muth, 196 F.2d 866, 871 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (collecting citations).
The presumption of voluntary performance can be rebutted only by proof of duress. E.g.,
Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133 (1952). See Notes, "Voluntary": A Concept in Er-
patriation Law, 54 COLm. L. R.Ea. 932 (1954), Expatriation-Requircinest that Ex-
pariation Be Voluntary, 22 GEo. WASH. L Rnv. 493 (1954).
36. 15 STAT. 223 (1868). For review of the factors responsible for passage of the
Proclamation of 1868, see MooRz, PsixcnL'.as oF AmESUcA= DLoMACY 23-89 (1918);
Borchard, Decadence of the American Doctrine of Voluntary Expatriation, 25 Al. J.
INT'L L. 312 (1931). An opinion of Attorney General Black entitled "Right of Expatria-
tion," 9 O's. A-'y Gmr. 356 (1859), wras extremely influential in bringing the United
States Congress to repudiate the conventional doctrine of perpetual allegiance, as to which
see Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 246 (1830) ; 3 KENT, Co, s AniEs 49
(14th ed. 1896).
37. See 15 StAr.223 (1868).
38. 34 STAT. 1228 (1907). See Roche, The Loss of Am,4wricws Nalionality, 99 U. PA.
L REv. 25, 26 (1950).
In 1865 Congress passed an "Act . . . to provide for enrolling and calling out the
National Forces" by which persons convicted of desertion and draft evasion were "deemed
and taken to have voluntarily relinquished and forfeited their rights of citizenship ... .
13 STAT. 487, 490 (1865). This statute was interpreted as having imposed loss of civil
rights rather than loss of nationality. Deserters were to remain Americans, i.e., not "aliens."
See Roche, supra, at 26, 61. Whether statutory e.\%patriation commenced in 1855 or 1907
does not seem important for the purposes of this paper. The date 1907 has been adopted
because the use of the term "expatriation" rather than "rights of citizenship" leaves no
doubt about the congressional intent to deprive the American of nationality itself.
For a general review of the history of the law of expatriation in the United States,
see GETrYs, Crnmzxsmnn IN TRE UrrED STATES 160-174 (1934) ; lMiA.xol, CIT IzNsHip
132-147 (1930); foopx, PszcnLzs op AwmcAx Drmourw cy 270-305 (1918) ; Borchard,
Decadence of the American Doctrine of Voluntary Extatriation, 25 AM. J. I.,T-L L 312
(1931).
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expatriation statutes Congress has designated certain acts which a citizen could
not voluntarily perform without losing his nationality, whether or not renun-
ciation of nationality was intended or desiredY0 Analysis of these statutes is
facilitated if it is recognized that expatriation legislation has been enacted with
three quite different objectives :40 (1) to create formal procedures for exercise
of the right of expatriation, in order to implement the right and to insure that
the Government receives adequate notice of its exercise; (2) to reduce the
number of dual nationals among United States citizens, and thereby to lessen
the opportunities for conflict with other nations over such persons; (3) to
punish American citizens who engage in criminal activities and thereby to en-
force the federal criminal law.
41
Voluntary Expatriation Statutes: Facilitation of a Right
The expression "voluntary expatriation," and the fact that expatriation
originated in American law as a "natural and inherent right,"42 suggest that
expatriation statutes would be enacted primarily to implement the right, to
39. Prior to the passage of the Expatriation Act, there were ten acts by which a
U.S. citizen might "voluntarily" relinquish his nationality:
(1) Obtaining naturalization in a foreign state.
(2) Taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign state.
(3) Entering, or serving in, the.armed forces of a foreign state.
(4) a. Accepting employment under the government of a foreign state where the
citizen has or acquires the nationality of such foreign state.
b. Accepting employment under the government of a foreign state for which
employment an oath of allegiance is required.
(5) Voting in a political election in a foreign state.
(6) Making a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic officer of the
United States in a foreign state.
(7) Making in the United States a formal written renunciation of nationality.
(8) Deserting the armed forces in time of war.
(9) Committing treason against, or attempting by force to overthrow, or bearing
arms against, the United States.
(10) Departing from or remaining outside of the United States in time of war for
the purpose of evading training and service in the armed forces.
66 STAT. 267, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1952). For an excellent review of expatriation under
these ten subsections, see Roche, The Loss of American Nationality, 99 U. PA. L. Rnv.
25 (1950).
For prior expatriation statutes see 58 STAT. 746 (1944) ; 54 STAT. 1168 (1940) ; 34
STAT. 1228 (1907) ; cf. 13 STAT. 490 (1865). See also Hearings Before the Conmnitlee on
Immigration and Naturalization of the House on a Bill to Revise the Nationality Lawes,
76th Cong., 1st Sess., 489-92 (1940).
40. For the view that voluntary expatriation statutes might be rationalized into two
groups, those concerned with dual nationality and those dealing with "dual allegiance,"
see Note, "Voluntary": A Concept in Expatriation Law, 54 COLum. L. REv. 932 (1954).
41. Subsections (8)-(10) of § 349(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66
STAT. 267, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1952), are considered to impose penal expatriation. For
text of subsections, see note 39 supra. See also Note, 54 COLMn. L. REV. 932, 935 & n,13
(1954). This classification is discussed in notes 76-100 infra and accompanying text.
42. See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
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provide formal procedures for its exercise, and to enable the government to
keep adequate records. There is, in fact, only one such statute. Thus, formal
renunciation of citizenship, in writing, before a diplomatic or consular officer
of the United States abroad, was made an expatriating act in 1940. a This type
of expatriation is "voluntary" in every sense of the word, since as a practical
matter the expatriating act will not be performed unless the citizen specifically
intends to renounce his citizenship. It raises no substantial question as to the
constitutional power of Congress to withdraw American citizenship. Indeed,
the only restriction on freedom imposed by such a statute is that it limils
the means by which the right of expatriation can be exercised to performance
of the prescribed formalities. There seems no doubt, however, that the govern-
ment may impose reasonable administrative restrictions on the exercise of rights
which may affect its operations and functions, as for example those relating
to protection of citizens abroad. -  This forthright and uncontroversial concept
of "voluntary" is, however, to be found only in the Proclamation of 1868 and
the Act of 1940. From the beginning, statutory expatriation has been based
on a significantly different usage of that term.
Regulatory Expatriation: Dual Nationality
Early expatriation legislation was designed to deal with the newly emerging
problem of dual nationality.45 The increased movement of people between
nations, liberalized procedures for naturalization, and conflicting systems
utilized by nations to confer citizenship on individuals at birth had created a
43. See 54 STAT. 1163 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (6) (1952).
44. See BORcHARD, DinLomATIC PRoErio OF CrIZE s AROAD (1916). The United
States has the responsibility to protect its nationals abroad. Id. §§ 7, 13, 133-34. Protection
often means dispute with other States over their treatment of American citizens. Id.
§§ 183-97. Cf. note 30 supra. The formal procedures required to effect renunciation inform
the government that particular individuals can no longer claim its diplomatic protection,
and thus prevent it from becoming unnecessarily embroiled in disputes with foreign nations
in behalf of such persons. Furthermore, without a notification requirement no treasun
prosecution would stand much chance of success. See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S.
717 (1952).
45. Subsections (1)-(5), (7) of § 349(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
66 STAT. 267 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (1952), impose expatriation on dual nationality
grounds. See note 39 supra for text of subsections. See Savorgnan v. United States, 333
U.S. 491, 500 n.17 (1950); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915); Notes, 54
CoLum. L. REv. 932, 938 (1954), 2 STAN. L. Rev. 582, 585 (1950).
Dual nationality has long been a cause of international friction and its elimination
has been a much desired aim of all nations. For a few of the articles which deal with the
problems of dual nationality in general, see Nielsen, Some Vexatious Questions Relating
to Natiozality, 20 CoLm.. L. REv. 840 (1920); Orfield, The Legal Effects of Dual
Nationality, 17 Gao. NVAsH. L. Rrv. 427 (1949) ; Preuss, International Law and Depriva-
tion of Nationality, 23 Gao. L. J. 250 (1934) ; Sandifer, A Con:parative Study of the Laws
Relating to Nationality at Birth and to Loss of Nationality, 29 Ams. J. INfTL L. 248
(1935); Wigimore, Domicile, Double Allegiance, and World Citicenship, 21 ILL L REv.
761 (1927).
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large group of persons who were nationals of more than one State.40 These
persons served as a constant source of friction among nations, since each parent
State demanded performance of the duties of citizenship, especially military
service. 47 In order to lessen such conflicts, Congress declared that the volun-
tary performance of certain acts by dual nationals would result in expatria-
tion.48 Typical of these were acts such as service in a foreign army, or accept-
ing employment under the government of a foreign State. Performance of such
acts indicated that the individual had elected to perform duties of citizenship
for the State of his foreign allegiance, 40 and in addition frequently put him in
a position where it was virtually impossible for the United States to provide
the diplomatic protection normally available to its citizens. 0 Acts by which a
foreign nationality was obtained, such as naturalization, or marriage by an
American woman to a national of another State, were also declared acts of
voluntary expatriation in order to prevent the creation of more dual citizens.51
46. For a comprehensive review of the nationality laws of most nations, and bibli-
ography, see LAWS CONCERNING NATIONALITY, U.N. Doc. No. ST/LEG/SER.B/4
(1954) ; FLOURNOY AND HuDsox, NATIONALITY LAWS xix-xx & passAui (1929) ; HARVARDB
RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, NATIONALITY 14, 38, 40, 41 (1929) (hereinafter cited
as HARvA, RESEARCH). Comparison between the various laws will reveal the wide diver-
gencies in the methods of granting citizenship at birth and by naturalization.
47. See HARvARD RESEARCH 38, 40-41; Gmnrvs, CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES
186 (1934); Finch, Dual Nationality and Military Service, 25 Am. J. INr'L L. 119
(1931) ; authorities cited note 45 supra.
48. See Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 500 & n.17 (1950).
49. Acquisition of the nationality of a foreign state was usually, under foreign na-
tionality laws, either a prerequisite to or consequence of performance of such acts. See,
e.g., LAWS CONCERNING NATIONALITY, U.N. Doc. No. ST/LEG/SER.B/4 at 71. (1954);
Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915). Where foreign nationality was not in fact
acquired, it could ordinarily be acquired with particular ease by any person who had
performed an expatriating act in the "dual nationality" category. Thus, many nations
accord uniquely favorable treatment under naturalization laws to members of their armed
forces. LAWS CONCERNING NATIONALITY, Op. cit. stepra, at 73, 109 (1955).
50. See BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD §§ 324-25, 379-80
(1916). Borchard states that the true meaning of expatriation with reference to a native-
born citizen is to denote forfeiture of the right to diplomatic protection. Id. § 324. Clearly
the United States is in no position to extend diplomatic protection to one of its citizens
who is a member of a foreign army.
51. See the provisions of the expatriation statutes cited at uote 39 Sn pro. The first
general expatriation statute, 34 STAT. 1228 (1907), provided for the expatriation of
Americans who became naturalized in a foreign state or who took an oath of allegiance
to a foreign state. The same Act also declared a marriage between an American woman
and a foreigner to be an act of expatriation. The latter provision is a vivid illustration
of the congressional effort to reduce the conflicts between nations over dual nationals,
Since most states automatically granted nationality to a foreign woman upon her mar-
riage to one of their citizens-it was generally said that a woman's nationality followed
that of her husband, Gzm'Ts, CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 136-39 (1934)-the
occasion of such a marriage provided an excellent signal for expatriation. As these old
doctrines began to be abandoned and women no longer took the nationality of their
spouses, the United States repealed this expatriation provision since it was no longer
necessary to forestall conflicts over dual nationals. 42 STAT. 1022 (1922) (the Cable
Act).
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Dual nationality legislation undoubtedly was cast originally in terms of
"voluntary" expatriation because Congress doubted the constitutionality of a
more direct formulation,52 and sought to utilize the 1868 Proclamation 0 as a
supporting precedent. 4 But effective use of voluntary expatriation to reduce
conflicts over dual nationals required a profound change in the meaning of
"voluntary." '5 If nationality could not be divested except by deliberate re-
nunciation, few persons would ever lose their United States citizenship, for
most would elect to retain the double benefits and protections of dual citizen-
ship. Congress therefore attempted to dispense with the requirement of sub-
jective intent to renounce nationality by indicating that mere performance of
one of the designated acts should operate automatically to divest American
citizenship.50 When such laws were challenged on the ground that they de-
prived the citizen of nationality without his consent, and were therefore void
for want of constitutional power, the courts upheld Congress. Voluntary ex-
patriation required only an objective standard of intent, they held, and this
standard was satisfied by a showing that performance of the designated act
was voluntary.5 7
In Mackenzie v. Hare,58 an American woman who had married a British
national sought to compel her registration as a qualified voter. Registration
52. See the remarks of Senator McCarran made during the Senate debate on the
Expatriation Act. 100 CoNG. RFEc. 14983 (1954). These statements, casting doubt upon
the constitutionality of the use of denationalization as a punishment for crime, were
probably fostered by the Supreme Court's early decisions on the congressional power
over citizenship. See notes 106-11 infra and accompanying text. See also Mackenzie
v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1893);
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827 (1824).
53. 15 STAT. 223 (1868).
54. See Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 499 n.11 (1950).
55. Compare notes 36-37 mtpra and accompanying text, uith notes 38-39, 49-51 sopra
and accompanying text. See Notes, 54 COLum. L. Rnv. 932, 934-35 (1954), 55 COLun.
L. Rxv. 631,663-66 (1955).
56. From the inception of statutory expatriation Congress has never made subjective
intent a necessary element of the government's case. In part this may have been due to
the fact that the particular act which was designated as expatriatory was in itself indica-
tive of the desire to renounce United States nationality. Actually, Congress w,-as deter-
mined to implement its policy and did not want to dilute the effectiveness of its enact-
ments by making an exception for persons who, being oblivious of the consequences of
their actions, blundered into losing their citizenship. An example of the result which was
achieved may be seen in Kazdy-Reich v. Marshall, 88 F. Supp. 787 (D.D.C. 1950), where
an American woman lost her nationality because she had voted in a Hungarian election.
The court was unable to preserve her citizenship even though it found that her voting
was motivated by a desire to aid American policies and defeat the communists. See also
Bisceglia v. Acheson, 196 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
57. E.g., Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915) ; Savorgnan v. United States, 338
U.S. 491 (1950); Perri v. Dulles, 206 F2d 586 (3d Cir. 1953); Acheson v. NVohlmuth,
196 F2d 866 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Revidin v. Acheson, 194 F2d 482 (2d Cir. 1952); Dos
Reis ex rel. Camara v. Nicolis, 161 F2d 860 (1st Cir. 1947).
58. 239 U.S. 299 (1915), 2 IowA L. BUL. 137, 14 fica. L. RE%. 233 (1916). See
Roche, The Loss of American Nationality, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 25, 27, 45-46 (1950).
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had been denied on the ground that she had lost her citizenship under the
statute of 1907 which made such a marriage an expatriating act. 0 Mrs. Mac-
kenzie challenged the constitutionality of the statute, urging that Congress had
,no power to withdraw citizenship without the concurrence of the citizen, and
that she had never intended or desired to renounce her citizenship. 0 The Court
replied that "conditions of national moment," particularly "international as-
pects," warranted upholding the legislation.0 ' The United States was a gov-
ernment invested with "all the attributes of sovereignty," and therefore neces-
sarily possessed "the powers of nationality, especially those which concern its
relations and intercourse with other countries. ' 62 It might be conceded, the
Court added, that Congress could not impose a change of citizenship "arbi-
trarily"--"without the concurrence of the citizen."0 3 But the case before it
involved "a condition voluntarily entered into, with notice of the consequences,"
and the legislation under attack was therefore constitutional.0 4
It seems essential to rational discussion of constitutional issues to recognize
that in the expatriation legislation considered in Mackenzie, Congress was not
merely facilitating exercise of the citizen's right to renounce citizenship volun-
tarily. It was using its power over foreign affairs to accomplish an affirmative
policy purpose.0 5 The concept of "voluntary" expatriation utilized by the court
in Mackenzie was totally different from the right to renounce citizenship pro-
claimed in 1868. The new concept served the modest function performed by
the requirement of "a voluntary act" in tort and criminal law: it established
only that where an act is performed under duress-where there is, in effect,
"no act"-no legal responsibility for the act is incurred. 0
What the Court in Mackenime correctly held, notwithstanding its use of the
"voluntary" label, was that Congress had power to take away citizenship,
59. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 307 (1915). The legislation challenged in
Mackenzie was eventually repealed, see note 51 supra, but the reasoning by which the
Court upheld it has been accepted as precedent by almost every court which has adjudicated
a voluntary expatriation question. See Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, (1950).
60. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1915). For recent acceptance of
a virtually identical argument, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's holding in Mac-
kenzie, see Terada v. Dulles, 121 F. Supp. 6 (D. Hawaii 1954).
61. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 312 (1915). Other portions of the Court's de-
cision make clear that the "conditions of national moment" which urged passage of the
legislation were the international frictions created by the conflict of claims to the alle-
giance of dual nationals. Id. at 311-12. See note 45 supra.
62. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915).
63. Ibid.
64. Id. at 312.
65. Id. at 311-12. See note 67 in!ra.
66. For discussion of the requirement of volition in tort and criminal law respectively,
see PROSsER, TORTS § 29 (1941); DEssioN, CRIMINAL LAW, ADmixSTRATION AND PUBLIC
ORDER 434-36 (1948). Compare the sense in which expatriation was said to be "volun-
tary" in Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1915).
On the doctrine of duress in expatriation law, see Notes, 54 CoLUm. L. REV. 932, 22
GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 493 (1954). For an extreme example of use of this concept to achieve
an equitable result, see Acheson v. Murakami, 176 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1949).
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with or without the dual citizen's consent, as a "necessary and proper" in-
cident to its "sovereign" power in the area of foreign affairs. 7 Dual nationals
have been a perennial source of international friction, and their nationality is
itself the cause of the difficulty.6s For Congress to forbid dual nationals to
perform acts which would tend to breed external problems, on pain of depri-
vation of nationality, or to impose loss of nationality when a second citizen-
ship is acquired, seems neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. It is in fact the only
practicable legislative means of dealing with the problem. Imposition of crimi-
nal penalties would aggravate external difficulties, since foreign States would
feel obliged to act to protect their nationals.60
Legislation enacted to deal with dual nationality problems falls within the
category of reasonable regulation.7 0 It is immaterial that the safeguards with
67. While the Court in Mackenzie was not explicit, and did not repudiate the "volun-
tary expatriation" rationale, commentators have uniformly agreed that the Court was
relying entirely on the government's "sovereign' power to conduct the nation's fureign
relations. See Roche, supra note 58, at 27; Note, 14 Micn. L. Rv. 233 (1916) ; L0 HA v.
L. REv. 977, 978 (1947). One commentator summarized the holding in these terms:
"The decision in effect recognizes the power of Congress to denationalize a person
without his consent, although the Constitution contains no express grant to Cungress
of such a power .... This is, of course, distinguished from the doctrine of voluntary
expatriation now recognized in the United States."
Note, 2 IowA L. Buu.. 137 & n.3 (1916).
This view has apparently not been accepted by Congress. Expatriation legislation has
continued to be labeled "voluntary." And see, e.g., the remarks of the late Senator Mc-
Carran of Nevada, expressing his doubts concerning the constitutionality of the Expatria-
tion Act. 100 CONG. REc. 14983 (1954). However, a review of expatriation provisiuns
now in effect makes questionable the extent to which Congress bhlieves that its power.
over citizenship are limited.
68. See notes 45-48 supra and accompanying text.
69. Cf. Right of Expatriation, 9 OPs. Anr'Y GEN. 356 (1859) ; Boc=amu, DipLoiTZc
PRoTETIcoN OF CrTizENs ABROAD §§ 127-29, 169-70, 183-97 (1916). The United States has
made continuing efforts to prevent conflict over dual nationals by concluding specific
citizenship treaties requiring each nation to drop its claim for citizenship duties when
the dual national performs certain acts in the other State. See, generally, Lkws Co:;-
cERNING NATIoNALTy, U.N. Doc. No. ST/LEG/SER.B/4 (1954); FLouRNo' AND
HuDsoN, NATIOALrIT LAws (1929). On United States participation in international
conferences and programs directed toward reducing the incidence of dual nationality,
see HARvARD RESEARCH 13-129.
70. Legislation expatriating Americans for acts by which a foreign citizenship is ac-
quired, and legislation applicable only to dual nationals which makes expatriation a con-
sequence of acts likely to create international friction, seem clearly to fall within this cate-
gory. Expatriation may also be warranted in the case of Americans who perform such
acts as voting in a foreign election or serving in a foreign army; such acts not only breed
diplomatic problems, but are evidence that the individual already has, or may easily acquire,
a foreign citizenship. Cf. note 49 supra. Some reasonable connection between the expatri-
ating act and dual nationality problems seems necessary, or the legislation ceases to be
regulatory and becomes penal. Perhaps a preferable means of dealing with persons who
perform acts which breed international friction, but do not result in acquisition of foreign
citizenship, would be to deny such persons the diplomatic protection normally due to
citizens, without, however, withdrawing citizenship itself. This course of action was in
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which the Constitution surrounds the criminal defendant are not afforded, since
this legislation is not penal. Its objective is not to deter or punish commission
of expatriating acts but to prevent the international tensions which follow
their commission; Congress had no penal intent3 1 The regulations are reason-
able not only because of the absence of a legislative alternative, but also be-
cause the acts enumerated almost invariably result in acquisition of foreign
citizenship, and are unlikely to be performed without awareness that they im-
port a close relationship with the foreign State.7 2 And the status of stateless-
ness is not imposed: the individual is deprived rather of the uniquely privileged
status of dual citizenship.73 Most relevant to the constitutionality of the Ex-
patriation Act of 1954 is the fact that in every expatriation case thus far con-
sidered by the Supreme Court the petitioner has either previously been a dual
national, 74 or has actually acquired a foreign citizenship by performing the act
which expatriated him under American law.7 On the facts of the cases, it
might well be contended that for the Supreme Court it is an open question
whether present dual nationality legislation may constitutionally operate to
divest an American of nationality where, under the laws of the foreign State
concerned, a second nationality was not acquired by performance of the ex-
patriating act. But whatever the constitutional status of dual nationality legis-
lation under present case law, a fortiori no Supreme Court decision establishes
the constitutionality of the legislation hereafter discussed, which utilizes ex-
patriation solely as a sanction, for its deterrent effect, and has no connection
with problems of dual citizenship or the foreign affairs of the United States.
Expatriation As Punishment for Crime
In the Nationality Act of 1940, T7 Congress first used expatriation for pur-
poses unrelated either to facilitation of the right of expatriation or to external
problems of dual nationality. 7 In the Nationality Act treason, desertion in
fact utilized before expatriation statutes were enacted. See Roche, The Loss of American
Nationality, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 25, 40, 43 (1950) ; Letter from the Secretary of State to
the Minister of France, [1873] 1 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 256, 259. See also BORCUAD, op. Cit.
supra note 69, §§ 315-80.
71. See notes 45-51 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the factual back-
ground which motivated congressional enactment of dual nationality expatriation legisla-
tion. For discussion of the criteria of "penal" legislation and citation of authority, see
notes 89-92 infra and accompanying text.
72. See notes 39,45 supra.
73. See note 45 supra and authorities there cited for discussion of dual nationality,
its privileges and drawbacks.
74. Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133 (1952) ; Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S.
717 (1952) ; Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939). In all three of these cases the Court
held, on statutory rather than constitutional grounds, that American citizenship had not
been divested.
75. Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S.
299 (1915). See also cases cited note 74 mtpra.
76. 54 STAT. 1168 (1940).
77. The Act of 1865, 13 STAT. 490, which deprived convicted deserters and draft
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time of war, and attempting by force to overthrow the government were made
acts of "voluntary" ex-patriation. 78 In 1944, the act of departing from or re-
maining outside the United States for the purpose of evading military service
in time of war or national emergency was similarly designated.7 The Ex-
patriation Act of 1954 adds rebellion, insurrection, seditious conspiracy and
violation of the Smith Act to the list of criminal expatriating acts.80 Except
in the case of draft avoidance, expatriation is incurred under these statutes
only when the individual is convicted of committing the expatriating act by a
court-martial or a court of competent jurisdiction.
Despite its "voluntary" label, it seems clear that the Expatriation Act and
similar legislation cannot fairly be pictured for constitutional purposes as a
mere establishment of means by which the individual can exercise his right of
voluntary expatriation.81 State and federal penal codes have long imposed upon
a convicted felon the loss of certain important civil rights, in addition to im-
prisonment, in much the same way as the Act of 1954.82 It has never been
suggested that a convict relinquished these rights voluntarily, nor that he
voluntarily chose to reside within the prison for the period of his sentence.
These are penal sanctions imposed by society for its own reasons without re-
gard to the wishes of the convicted criminal. To apply the label "voluntary
incarceration" to the imprisonment which follows conviction of a subversive
crime would not alter its nature as a criminal punishment. "Voluntary ex-
patriation" is an equally inappropriate label for the loss of nationality which
now results from the same conviction.
Neither can the Expatriation Act and its prototypes qualify for the category
of reasonable regulation. No problems of nationality, such as those arising
evaders of the "rights of citizenship" may have been a model for congressional action in
1940. The hearings on the Nationality Act indicate, however, that Congress meant to add
loss of nationality to the penalties provided by the 1865 statute. Congress apparently believed
that the 1865 Act dealt only with the "rights of citizenship" although there was authority
to the contrary. See Roche, supra note 70, at 62; cases cited note 89 infra.
78. Nationality Act of 1940 §§ 401(g), (h), 54 SrAT. 1168, S U.S.C. §§ 1481 (a) (8,
(9) (1952).
79. 58 STAT. 746 (1944), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (10) (1952).
80. See note 4 supra. See also 1 OPF-xHEIM, INVTEPNATioN.%L LAW § 313a (7th ed.,
Lauterpacht 1948); Roche, The Loss of American Nationality, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 25,
70 (1950) ; Note, "Voluntary": A Concept in Expatriation Law, 54 COLum. L. Ray. 932,
935 n.13 (1954).
81. See notes 89-96 infra and accompanying text.
82. Most state laws render an ex-convict ineligible to vote, to run for elective office,
or to sit on a jury. Certain states make conviction of a felony an automatic ground for
divorce. One-third of the states impose "civil death" for conviction of certain serious
crimes. In addition, the practice of certain professions may be closed to the ex-convict.
For fuller exposition of the civil right status of the convicted felon both during and
after imprisonment, and citation of pertinent laws and cases, see, Gathings, Loss of
Citizenship and Civil Rights for Coniction of Crnw, 43 Am. P0L Sci. Ray. 12a (1949) ;
Holtzoff, Loss of Civil Rights by Conviction of Crime, 6 FMn. PnouATiox 18 (Apl.-June
1942) ; Comment, The Legal Status of Convicts During and After Incarceration, 37 VA.
L. REv. 105 (1951); Note, Convicts-Legal Status, 34 VA. L. REv. 463 (1948).
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from the phenomenon of dual citizenship, are attacked by these statutes."
Indeed, by rendering individuals stateless these statutes may operate to create
new and vexing problems of nationality when denationalized individuals go or
are sent abroad.8 4 Nor is the power over foreign affairs here involved. While
dual nationality expatriation is addressed to the reduction of external fric-
tions, 5 penal expatriation operates internally to discourage violation of the
law and to punish crimes already committed. SO And with respect to penal
expatriation, the Government may not plead an absence of alternatives. While
dual nationality problems could only be attacked through the instrumentality
of expatriation,8 7 other criminal sanctions such as fines, imprisonment, and
even death were readily available to Congress to combat criminal behavior
within the United States."
It seems certain that expatriation as imposed by the Act of 1954 is "punish-
ment" within the constitutional definition of that term.8 1 The distinction be-
83. Reference is made only to those subsections of § 349 (a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act listed at note 41 supra, and summarized at note 39 supra. It is evident
from the text of these subsections that Congress was completely oblivious of the prob-
lems created by dual nationality when it declared these acts expatriatory. For affirmative
evidence of the intent of Congress in enacting these subsections, see notes 32 supra, 94
infra.
84. See notes 163-66 infra and accompanying text. Laws which create stateless
persons have been universally condemned by international law conferences and con-
mentators as inhumane and also productive of international problems. See Protocol
Concerning Statelessness, Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law
(1930), reprinted in 5 HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 387 (1936) ; United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 15, U.N. Doe. A/810, pp. 71, 74
(1948) (adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on Dec. 10, 1948), reprinted in
UNESCO, HUMAN RIGHTS, A SyxMpostut app. III (1949) (hereinafter cited a, United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights); HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW e. 11
(3rd ed. 1951) ; 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 311-313a (7th ed., Lauterpacht
1948).
85. See notes 45-51 supra and accompanying text.
86. See notes 76-80 supra and accompanying text. Each of these acts is separately
designated and punished as a crime by other sections of the U.S. Code.
87. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
88. The maximum punishment presently provided for persons convicted of violating
the Smith Act, 54 STAT. 670 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952), is ten years in prison,
$10,000 fine, and exclusion from government employment for five years. Rebellion or
insurrection, 62 STAT. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 2383 (1952), carries a maximum penalty
of $10,000 fine and ten years' imprisonment, and renders the individual ineligible for
any federal office. Seditious conspiracy, 62 STAT. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (1952),
carries maximum penalties of six years in prison or a $5,000 fine or both.
Attorney General Brownell has requested Congress to increase the maximum penalties
for these three crimes to twenty years imprisonment or a $20,000 fine or both, and a bill
implementing this request was passed by the House of Representatives on July 5, 1955 and
referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 2854, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1955). See N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1955, p. 12, cols. 4-5.
89. The deprivation of the "rights of citizenship" imposed by the Act of 1865, 13
STAT. 490, has been classed as penal by both the State Department and the courts. Hear-
ings Before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization of the House to revise the
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tween punishment, in the constitutional sense, and non-penal, civil deprivations
has never been made entirely clear by the courts." Several commentators
have suggested, however, that the crucial element is penal intent on the part
of Congress.9 ' Probably the severity of the deprivation is also relevant in
determining this question. 92 By both criteria, the Expatriation Act is penal.1
3
The debates on the Act indicate that the functions of denationalization were to
be those usually associated with criminal sanctions: deterrence and punish-
ment.9 4 The sanction is imposed, like any punishment, upon conviction by a
court-95 And the Act does not, as dual citizenship statutes do, merely remit
the individual to one of two citizenships. Rather, it imposes upon him the
Nationality Laws, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 492 (1940). Because of its classification as a
criminal punishment, the Supreme Court would not permit an individual to le refused the
rights of a citizen under the 1865 Act until he had been convicted of one of the right-for-
feiting crimes by a court of competent jurisdiction. Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 (1885);
see also Holt v. Holt, 59 Me. 464 (1871) ; Huber v. Reily, 53 Pa. 112 (1866). If deprivation
of the individual rights of citizenship is held a criminal punishment, then surely with-
drawal of nationality itself-the entire bundle of rights which the citizen possesses and the
alien does not-must be a penal sanction. And cf. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303
(1946); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 54-55 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 918
(1951).
90. Compare, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946), ulth Hawker
v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898). See also Vormuth, Legislative Disqualifications as
Bills of Attainder, 4 VAND. L. REv. 603 (1951) ; Comment, 64 Y.s .J. 712 (1955).
91. See Vormuth, stpra note 90, at 603, 608-10; Comment, 64 YALE I.J. 712, 722-24
& ni. 62-68 (1955).
92. Cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952); Klapprott Y. United
States, 335 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1949). In these cases the Supreme Court actmowledged
that the sanction of deportation ,as as severe as most sanctions classified as penal. The
Court indicated that this severity would ordinarily qualify the deprivatiun as a penal
one but for other special considerations concerned with the government's power over
aliens. See also United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946) (severity of pro-
scription from government employment influential in Court's decision that statute im-
posed "punishment").
93. The Supreme Court has stated that "[deprivation] of . . . American citzenhip
is an extraordinarily severe penalty," carrying consequences which "may be more
grave than consequences that flow from conviction for crimes." Klapprott Y. United
States, 335 U.S. 601, 611-612 (1949). In numerous other cases the Supreme Court
has emphasized the harshness of deprivation of citizenship. E.g., Knauer v. United States,
328 U.S. 654, 658 (1946) (loss of "cherished status"); Schneiderman v. United States,
320 U.S. 118, 159 (1943). While the Court has never classified this deprivation as penal,
its refusal to recognize removal of citizenship as a criminal punishment has always been
in cases where the government sought to denaturalice Americans who were alleged to
have obtained their citizenship by fraudulent oaths or representations. Klapprott v.
United States, supra; Knauer v. United States, suira (discussion of the "void ab initio"
doctrine of denaturalization). Cf. note 145 infra.
94. See pertinent portions of Congressional Record cited note 32 stipra. The con-
gressional debates on the amendment to the Nationality Act of 1940, 58 STAT. 746 (1944),
which made draft avoidance an expatriating act, indicate that Congress was intent on
punishment and deterrence at that time also. 90 Coxo. Rr.c. 7629 (1944).
95. Expatriation Act of 1954, 68 STAT. 1146, 8 U.S.C.A. § 148(a) (9) (Supp. 1954).
Loss of the rights of citizenship, imposed by the Act of 1865, 13 STAT. 490, could not be
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status of statelessness, in which he has few effective rights and no inalienable
rights under international law or under the laws of any nation." And from
a policy point of view, this sanction seems sufficiently severe that Congress
should not be permitted to impose it without conforming to all the constitu-
tional provisions which are applicable to penal legislation. For only a deter-
mination that expatriation is a penal sanction would bring into operation the
constitutional protections afforded by the fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth amend-
ments.
97
The Expatriation Act would not be rendered unconstitutional per se by a
holding that its sanction is penal in nature, since its draftsmen made conviction
a prerequisite to expatriation. But the Act of 1944, which made draft evasion
an expatriating act without requiring conviction, would be invalid under this
rationale.98 And with respect to the Act of 1954, a determination that it is
penal in character would have a bearing on the fundamental question whether
the Constitution grants to Congress the power to use expatriation as a punish-
ment. It would in addition open the statute to attack as a "cruel and unusual
punishment" proscribed by the eighth amendment. 9
It is clear at the least that the constitutional problems raised by penal
expatriation are quite different from those which have previously arisen in
connection with dual nationality expatriation, and accordingly that Mackenzie
and subsequent cases can by no means be automatically applied. By carrying
the concept of "voluntary" to final meaninglessness, the Expatriation Act of
1954 makes it virtually certain that the courts will at last disregard it, turn
afresh to the Constitution itself, and make the new analysis for which penal
expatriation seems to call.100
effected without conviction by a court. See note 89 supra; Kurtz v. Moflitt, 115 U.S. 487,
501 (1885) ; cf. People v. Frontczek, 286 Mich. 51, 281 N.W. 534 (1938).
96. See notes 139-43 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the extreme
severity of the disabilities of statelessness.
97. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) ; notes 20-25 supra and
accompanying text.
98. 58 STAT. 746 (1944). If withdrawal of citizenship is a penal sanction, then tile
imposition of denationalization upon persons charged with draft avoidance by leaving
the United States or remaining outside its boundaries in time of war would appear to be
unconstitutional unless such persons were first convicted of that crime by a competent
court. The congressional debates during consideration of the expatriation for draft
evasion measure indicate that Congress levied the sanction with penal intent. 90 CoNa.
RE.. 7629 (1944); cf. Kurtz v. Moffitt, 11S U.S. 487 (1885); McCafferty v. Guyer, 59
Pa. 109 (1868) ; Huber v. Reily, 53 Pa. 112 (1866).
99. The protections afforded by U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII apply only where infliction
of criminal punishment is attempted. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,
730 (1893).
100. Unless the Expatriation Act is seen as an exercise of the power to punish, th
Act would apparently be void either for lack of (foreign affairs) power, or as a denial
of substantive due process of law. The due process clause requires a reasonable relation
to the relief sought; statutes may not be arbitrary and discriminatory. E.g., Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382, 391-92 (1950); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); Nebbia v. New York,
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CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO TAKE AWAY NATIONALITY
Supreme Court dicta,101 the fourteenth amendment's unequivocal grant of
citizenship at birth,102 and the long-continued congressional practice of phras-
ing expatriation legislation in terms of "voluntary" expatriation 103 have pro-
duced the belief that the Constitution grants to Congress no power to effect
denationalization without the consent of the citizen.10 4 It seems likely, there-
291 U.S. 502 (1934). Since the legitimate purpose of the power to impose expatriation
by regulatory legislation is mitigation of external problems created by dual nationality,
the required relationship between problem and sanction would seem not to exist. Particu-
larly since Congress itself apparently believed it could not constitutionally impose ex-
patriation as punishment for crime, a court might content itself with determining whether
the Act is constitutional as a non-penal regulation. However, it would seen that Con-
gress should be deemed to have used whatever power it had available to enact a valid
statute. It is therefore assumed hereafter that when and if the courts hold the Act
an impermissible use of the regulatory power, they will proceed to consider the question
whether it constitutes a permissible punishment.
The standard of substantive due process vith respect to punishments would seem satis-
fied if a sanction might reasonably be considered to serve any of the usual objectives of
punishment, e.g., deterrence. See note 149 infra. The courts have apparently rejected any
extension of the "shocks the conscience" test of Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)
(procedural due process), to substantive due process cases. See Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128, 133, 142 (1954). The latter standard would in any event seem substantially in-
distinguishable from that demanded by the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishments, discussed in notes 124-57 infra and accompanying text. See Note, 4
VAtN-. L. Rv. 680 (1951), and cases there cited.
101. See notes 106-10 infra and accompanying text
102. "[AIll persons born or naturalized in the United States . . .are citizens." U.S.
CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. This amendment has not been construed to enlarge the power
of Congress in order to permit the withdrawval of citizenship. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239
U.S. 299, 310 (1915); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 703 (1898);
Minoru Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943) (by implication).
103. Expatriation legislation from 1865 to 1954 has been cast in "voluntary" terms.
See citation of statutes at note 39 supra. Even when Congress has sought to force an
election by dual nationals, demanding the forfeiture of one of two citizenships, the statutes
have been cast in terms of a conclusive presumption of "voluntary expatriation." 66 STAT.
268, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(b) (1952).
104. See notes 32, 94 supra. Senator McCarran, a strong advocate of bold anti-sub-
versive legislation, apparently believed that Congress lacked the constitutional power to
make loss of nationality a punishment for crime. He opposed the original version of the
Expatriation Act in the belief that it was unconstitutional and only voted for the bill when
Congress accepted his amendment recasting certain provisions of the act in "voluntary"
terms. See 100 CONG. REc. 14983 (1954). The amendment eliminated the "status" of
being a communist from the list of expatriating acts and required instead a conviction
of a crime voluntarily performed by the communist before denationalization could be
imposed. Ibid. This change was plainly unnecessary if Congress in fact possesses power
to deprive the citizen of his nationality without his consent.
For cases and commentators which have accepted the "no power" conclusion, at
least in part, see, e.g., Perri v. Dulles, 206 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Dos Reis cx rel.
Camara v. Nicolis, 161 F2d 860 (1st Cir. 1947); Terada v. Dulles, 121 F. Supp. 6 (D.
Hawaii 1954); Kiyokuro Oldmura v. Acheson, 99 F. Supp. 587 (D. Hawaii 1951),
remanded, 342 U.S. 899 (1952), aff'd, 111 F. Supp. 303 (D. Hawaii 1953) ; Citizenship of
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fore, that a primary line of argument against the constitutionality of the Ex-
patriation Act will be that the "voluntary" concept as there used is an invalid
fiction; that the Act is an attempt to impose denationalization without the
citizen's consent; and that the Act is accordingly void for lack of express or
implied constitutional power.10 5
The view that Congress lacks power to impose expatriation without the
consent of the citizen appears to rest primarily on dicta which do not in fact
support it. The widely cited statements in Osborn v. Bank of thc Unitcd
States 100 and United States v. Wong Kim Ark 107 appear to establish merely
that the "power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization"10 8 is not the
power to impose loss of nationality, 109 not that no power exists tinder any
clause of the Constitution. In Mackenzie the Court conceded, arguendo, that
the Government might not remove citizenship "arbitrarily, that is to say, with-
out the concurrence of the citizen." 110 But its holding is subject to a quite
Mrs. Berryman, 30 Ors ATr'y GEN. 412 (1919); Williams, Denaic, nalization, 8 BRIr,
Y.B. INT'L L. 45, 48 (1927); Notes, 40 CORN. L.Q. 365 (1955), 25 So. CALM L. Rv.
196 (1952). But see Roche, The Loss of American Natlionality, 99 U. PA. L. Rzv. 25,
27 (1950) (power to provide for loss of nationality is inherent in sovereignty in the area
of foreign relations). Were the Constitution being interpreted for the first time, the
"Power to establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization," U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl, 4,
might be construed to grant Congress a plenary power both to confer and withdraw
citizenship. However, it has long been held that this clause of the Constitution is limited
to a mere authorization to confer citizenship. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S.
649, 703 (1898) ; Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827 (1824).
105. This was the major argument of petitioner in Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299,
307, 310 (1915). The dual nationality expatriation statute there contested was upheld
by the Supreme Court, semble, as a legitimate exercise of Congress' foreign relations
power, yet formally at least the Court preserved the "voluntary" rationale. See notes
58-66 supra. No penal expatriation statute has ever been tested by the courts.
106. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827 (1824).
107. 169 U.S. 649, 703 (1898).
108. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
109. "A naturalized citizen . . . . becomes a member of the society, possessing all
the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the view of the constitution, on the
footing of a native. The constitution does not authorize congress to enlarge or
abridge those rights. The simple power of the national legislature is, to prescribe
a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far
as respects the individual."
Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,
827 (1824). In 1898 Justice Gray, speaking for the Court, reiterated the Marshall view:
"The power of naturalization, vested in Congress by the Constitution, is a power
to confer citizenship, not a power to take it away."
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 703 (1898). This case upheld a claim to
citizenship by birth asserted by the American-born son of alien Chinese permanently
domiciled in the United States. From the words of these two opinions it has apparently
been inferred that Congress possesses no power to withdraw citizenship. In fact, the
relevant dicta appear to refer only to power derived from the naturalization clause of the
Constitution. See cases and articles cited note 67 supra.
110. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915).
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different interpretation, as has been seen,' and in any event was concerned
exclusively with dual nationality expatriation and the power over foreign
affairs.
The constitutional power question posed by the Expatriation Act is whether
Congress has power, under the "necessary and proper" clause,112 to impose
denationalization as a sanction to enforce a criminal statute enacted pursuant
to a granted power. 1 3 For the Constitution grants no explicit power to define
and punish any crimes except treason, crimes against the law of nations, and
several other crimes of relatively rare occurrence. 114 Nearly all federal criminal
statutes stem from the power to enact legislation which is "necessary and
proper" to carry expressly granted powers into execution.11 Neither does the
Constitution grant any express power to impose fines, imprisonment or any
other particular type of punishment; these powers are implied as well. And
since the decision in McCidloch v. Maryland."0 the "necessary and proper"
clause has been interpreted as a grant of power rather than a limitation upon
power. The Supreme Court has never interpreted this clause to authorize re-
view of the discretion of Congress in choosing the means by which to carry
into execution the powers conferred by the Constitution." 7 The constitutional
phrase "necessary and proper" means "necessary" only in the sense that a
reasonable legislator might consider the means chosen necessary to implement
111. See text at notes 58-66 supra.
112. U.S. CoxsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18. For general discussion and citatiun of leading
cases concerned with the scope of the powers granted Congress by this clause of the
Constitution, see CoRwix, THE COXSMTIOx 65-67 (Sth ed. 1946); Lwi.swa'vr REFan-
E.CE SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CoNG.Rss, THE CONSTITUTION OF TE UNxITE STATE-% oF
AmERICA, S. Doc. No. 170, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 307-11 (1953) (hereinafter cited as S.
Doc. No. 170). See, especially, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 310 (1819);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) ; Ex arte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1834);
United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343 (1878); United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670 (1877).
113. No court has ever considered this question. Terada v. Dulles, 121 F. Supp. 6,
10 (D. Hawaii 1954), considered the question whether power to take away citizenship
might be implied as a necessary and proper aid to the exercise of the power to confer
citizenship. The court emphatically decided that no such power could be implied. Six
also Notes, 40 Coax. L.Q. 365, 23 GEo. ,VAsH. L. R EV. 772 (1955), 48 AM. J. INT'L L 663
(1954).
114. See U.S. Coxsr. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (treason); art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (law of natiuns,
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas) ; art. I, § 8, cl. 6 (counterfeiting).
115. See S. Doc. No. 170 at 308. See, e.g., United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670 (1877) ;
Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882) ; United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343 (1878).
116. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Chief Justice Marshall's authoritative state-
ment set the tone for future decisions:
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scupe of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit
of the constitution, are constitutionaL" Id. at 421.
117. CoRwix, THE CONSTITUTIOx 65-67 (8th ed. 1946). See Supreme Court cases
interpreting the "necessary and proper" clause cited in S. Doc. Nu. 170 at 307-11. These
ruling Supreme Court cases have without exception upheld exercises of governmental
powers under this clause.
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a granted power, and "proper" in the sense that no specific prohibition is vio-
lated." 8
Even if the "voluntary" rationale is disregarded, as seems both likely and
desirable,"' it nevertheless seems certain that under present case law the "lack
of power" argument is doomed to failure. The Expatriation Act is clearly a
"necessary" means of enforcing the statutes against treason, rebellion and
subversion since it will tend to deter violation of those statutes. 12 ) And the
question whether it is "proper" legislation seems foreclosed by the decision in
Dennis v. United States,121 which held that the Smith Act was a legitimate
exercise of the federal government's power of self-protection. 12 Unless the
Supreme Court is willing to find in the necessary and proper clause a new
limitation on congressional power, 23 arguments against the necessity and
propriety of penal expatriation must be directed not to the courts but to the
Congress. The constitutionality of the Expatriation Act would appear to de-
pend ultimately upon whether use of denationalization as a punishment for
crime violates explicit constitutional limitations on congressional power.
THE EXPATRIATION ACT AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
CONGRESSIONAL POWER
The conclusion that expatriation is imposed as a punishment for crime
sharply limits the constitutional questions which the Act raises. All but one
of the constitutional provisions relevant to criminal statutes regulate the types
of conduct which Congress may make criminal, or the procedures it may pre-
scribe for determining guilt. The only constitutional provision which ex-
plicitly restricts the congressional power to punish, once guilt has been as-
certained, is the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ments.1 24 While some doubt may exist that the Expatriation Act is fully con-
118. Compare United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941), with United States
v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670 (1877).
119. See notes 76-100 supra and accompanying text.
120. See authorities cited note 117 supra.
121. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
122. "That it is within the power of the Congress to protect the Government of the
United States from armed rebellion is a proposition which requires little discussion ... .
Dennis v. United States, supra note 121, at 501. See Burroughs v. United States, 290
U.S. 534 (1934) (power of self-protection-Federal Corrupt Practices Act); United
States v. Metzdorf, 252 Fed. 933 (D. Mo. 1918) (same-statute protecting the President).
See also U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (treason).
123. The chance of success in advocating the unconstitutionality of the Expatriation
Act on "lack of power" grounds will depend upon the Court's willingness to accept a
new construction of the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution. Chief Justice
Marshall's interpretation of the clause, see note 116 supra, would have to be altered to
permit judicial review of the necessity and propriety, apart from other constitutional
provisions, of the legislative means chosen by Congress for carrying into effect its granted
powers.
124. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNST. amend. VIII.
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sistent with other constitutional provisions,12 5 the principal question raised by
the Act is whether expatriation constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment
within the meaning of that amendment.
Expatriation as a Cruel and Unusual Punishmcnt
The Supreme Court has never had occasion to consider whether any punish-
ment imposed by federal statute was "cruel and unusual," and its few opinions
on the constitutionality of state and territorial punishments have added little
gloss to the words of the amendment-2 0 An "unusual" punishment is defined
125. Arguments against the Expatriation Act may exist under several procedural
and substantive provisions of the Constitution. Each is hampered, if not defeated, by the
conclusion that expatriation is a punishment, and the fact that it is inpised after
conviction of crime in a constitutional trial.
First Amendment. The Smith Act was declared not to restrict any constitutionally
protected conduct in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1950). However, in sUme cases
the Court has stated that first amendment constitutionality is determined by a process of
balancing the seriousness of the restraints imposed against the substantiality of the public
interest involved. E.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 32, 399-400
(1950). Every criminal statute discourages borderline conduct not prohibited by it,
to a degree which varies with the severity of the punishment imposed for violation. It
might therefore be urged that addition of expatriation as a punishment for violation of
the Smith Act would so increase the "seriousness of the restraint" on speech as to make
the restraint unconstitutional. Presumably acceptance of this rationale would result in invali-
dation of the Expatriation Act rather than the Smith Act. However, the courts have never
conceded that severity of punishment exerts any influence on determinations of substantive
constitutionality. See CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATs 396, 480 (1941).
Ex post facto Clause. Since as a practical matter the civil deprivations imposed by
statute against aliens are the "punishment" imposed by the Expatriation Act, these
statutes may be deemed "penal" as applied to expatriates. For alternative rationaleN
supporting such a conclusion, see notes 144-45 infra. Since the Expatriation Act would
apparently authorize application of such statutes even when enacted subsequent to
the crime--infliction of "punishment" not provided by law at the time of commissiun
of the crime-it could be held to violate the ex post facto clause. U.S. Coxsr. art. II, §
9, cl. 3, Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 385 (1793). Such a holding w ould seem
justified, if at all, whether or not the particular statute then before the court was in
effect at the time of commission of the crime. This argument would apparently be
defeated by a holding that "punishment" is inflicted only once, in the form of a deprivation
of "rights" by the Expatriation Act, and that subsequent deprivations are civil in character.
Void-for-vagueness. As an element of due process, criminal statutes must give fair
notice of what conduct is proscribed. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948);
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). A persuasive argument might be made
that notice must also be given of the penalty which will be imposed for violation. The
concrete consequences of expatriation are highly uncertain. See notes 144-55 infra and
accompanying text. However, no direct authority for this argument exists. Cf. People ex
rel. Pirfenbrink, 96 Il1. 68, 70 (1879) (loss of rights imposed must be certain) ; Ex torte
Jordan, 190 Cal. 416, 212 Pac. 913 (1923) (indeterminate sentence statutes permissible if
the maximum punishment clearly appears); People v. Roche, 389 I11. 361, 59 N.E.2d 8St
(1945) (same) ; Ex parte Mote, 98 Kan. 804, 160 Pac. 223 (1916) (same).
126. The principal eighth amendment cases decided by the Supreme Court are
Louisiana ex rcl. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) ; Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349 (1910); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878), discussed infra, text at
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as one that was unknown at common law or has become obsolete in modern
times.127 Denationalization certainly falls within this definition, since it was
never used by the United States as a punishment until 1940.128
It is more difficult to determine whether denationalization is "cruel" in the
constitutional sense. The general policy goal of the eighth amendment seems
to be the avoidance of unnecessary or disproportionate destruction of human
values.' 2 An unnecessarily cruel means of inflicting a permissible penalty, for
example, is considered to violate this amendment. 130 It is also clear that punish-
ments overly severe in relation to the seriousness of the offense are pro-
scribed. 13 1 Finally, some punishments violate the eighth amendment in that the
deprivation of human values inflicted is so great as to preclude the possibility
of a net value gain to society from their application.'8 2 Physical torture is such
a penalty, presumably because inviolability of the human person is considered
more important than any benefit which might conceivably be secured by the
State through use of this type of punishment.18 3 It is not at all clear, however,
notes 130-33. For general discussion of the eighth amendment see S. Doc. No. 170 at
903-05; 1 SCHOFIELD, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & EQUITY 421-40 (1921); Sutherland, Die
Process & Cruel Pinishient, 64 HARV. L. Ray. 271. (1950) ; Notes, 4 VAND. L. REV. 680
(1951), 34 MINN. L. REv. 134 (1950). See also discussion in United States v. Rosenberg,
195 F.2d 583, 607-10 (2d Cir. 1952), and historical analysis in Weems v. United States,
supra, at 366-80.
127. Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 Fed. 687, 690 (D. Nev. 1918) ; Hobbs v. State, 133 Ind,
404, 32 N.E. 1019 (1893) ; cf. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) ; It re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 443, 447 (1890) ; Territory v. Ketchum, 10 N.M. 718, 65 Pac. 169
(1901); 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LImiTATIONS 694 (8th ed., Carrington 1927).
128. See text at notes 76-80 supra. Compare the statute of 1865, 13 STAT. 490, which
employed loss of the "rights of citizenship" as punishment for desertion in time of war,
distinguished from denationalization statutes in Roche, The Loss of American Nationality,
99 U. PA. L. Rv. 25 (1950). The constitutionality of even this statute has apparently
never been tested. Cf., e.g., Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 (1885) (criminal trial and
sentence required) ; Goetcheus v. Matthewson, 61 N.Y. 420 (1875) (same) ; Huber v. Reily,
53 Pa. 112 (1866) (same).
129. See authorities cited note 126 supra.
130. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (19,17) (dictum) ; In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,447 (1890) (same).
131. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) ; O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323,
340 (1892) ; Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 Fed. 687, 689 (D. Nev. 1918) ; McDonald v. Com-
monwealth, 173 Mass. 322, 328, 53 N.E. 874, 875 (1899).
132. Cf. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) ; Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910) ; Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878) ; Mickle
v. Henrichs, 262 Fed. 687, 689 (D. Nev. 1918). See Note, 4 VAND. L. REV. 680 (1951).
133. See authorities cited notes 126, 132 supra.
The eighth amendment was originally intended to prohibit physical torture. See Wilker-
son v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) ; Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 Fed. 687, 689 (D. Nev.
1918); Notes, 4 VAND. L. REV. 680, 685 n.48 (1951), 30 COLUmI. L. REv. 1057 (1930).
The Supreme Court has stated, however, that the amendment progressively incorporates
contemporary standards for civilized treatment of criminal offenders. Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). See also Mickle v. Henrichs, supra; Davis v. Berry,
216 Fed. 413 (D. Iowa 1914), rev'd on other grounds, 242 U.S. 468 (1917) ; 2 STORY, THE
CONSTITUTION § 1903 (3d ed. 1858).
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what other aspects of human dignity are so fundamental as to impose an ab-
solute limitation on the power to punish.
The Expatriation Act was intended to effect a permanent deprivation of
all rights of nationality, and there is doubt whether even a pardon could re-
store citizenship once lost by operation of law. 34 By any standard, this
deprivation is severe, for American citizenship is "one of the most valu-
able rights in the world today."'135 The individual who loses it loses many
economic and political rights, including the right to engage in the profes-
sions and many other types of employment; he loses the right to vote and
the right to hold public office.', And while the alien has such substantive
rights as freedom of speech and press and the right to substantive due process
of law, and is accorded full procedural rights in criminal cases, these rights
are not applicable against deportation. 37 The alien may be expelled with few
procedural safeguards for conduct in which citizens may engage with im-
punity. 3 " His substantive and procedural rights are thus defective in an im-
portant respect, and all his rights under the Constitution may be effectively
terminated by removing him from the area in which that document is operative.
134. Representative Robsion, the Act's sponsor in the House, stated that only an act
of Congress could restore citizenship, and that a presidential pardon could ot. See 10
CoxG. REc. 11281 (1954). But see GErs, CITIZeXSuxP IN ran UNITED SrArs 59, 164
(1934) ; Roche, The Loss of American Nationalit,, 99 U. PA. L REV. 25, 61 (1950). See,
generally, Note, 55 CoLUM. L. REv. 631, 665 n257 (1955).
Several courts have cited the absence of a possibility of reiabilitatiun as one index uf
eighth amendment cruelty. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910) ; Mickle
v. Henrichs, supra note 133, at 691 (penal sterilization) ; Davis v. Berry, supra note 133,
at 416 (same); Note, 10 NEB. L. BULLt 164 (1931).
135. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMissiox O- IMMIGRATION AND NATLCRALIZATIO",
235 (1953).
136. See notes 12-17 supra and accompanying text. The loss of these rights may be
considered to have little constitutional significance, since persons affected by the Expatria-
tion Act will necessarily be felons. And statutes now in effect in many jurisdictions subject
all felons to many of the same political and economic disabilities as aliens. See Gathings,
Loss of Citizenship and Civil Rights for Conriction of Crinm, 43 A-s. PotL Sc. Rtv. 1228
(1949); Holtzoff, Loss of Civil Rights by Conviction of Crime, 6 FED. PnoBATo; 18
(Apr.-June 1942) ; Comment, 37 VA. L. Rzv. 105 (1951) ; Note, 34 VA. L tPmr 463 (1948).
137. See notes 18-26 supra and accompanying text. On the substantive and procedural
rights of aliens outside the context of deportation, see authorities cited notes 11, 12 supra.
Considerable question exists as to whether expatriated native-born Americans could
be deported under existing statutes, since they have never "entered" the United States as
aliens. Present statutes authorize deportation of aliens who, "after entry," fall within
described classes. 66 STAT. 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1952). And "entry" is defined as "any
coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place... ." 66 SmTA. 166,
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (13) (1952). However, this requirement might be disregarded as in-
tended merely to differentiate deportation statutes from exclusion statutes, or the date of
expatriation might be considered the date of "entry" as an alien. The latter construction is
suggested by the legislative history of the Expatriation Act. See note 18 supra.
138. See notes 18-26 supra and accompanying text. Several deportation provisions,
e.g., 66 STAT. 204, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a) (6) (B)-(H) (1952) (innocent membership in the
Communist Party, inter alia), would apparently violate the first amendment if they were
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But no description of expatriation as the loss of particular rights is adequate.
For expatriation represents a loss of the right to have rights-loss of mem-
bership in an organized community capable of guaranteeing any rights at all.180
The individual becomes a stateless person, with no right to stay anywhere on
the face of the earth. Every "sovereign" State has the right to expel aliens
from its borders, and modern States including the United States do so freely."10
Neither has he a right to leave any country; no State is obliged to issue a pass-
used against citizens. Compare Harisiades v. United States, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), with
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516 (1950). See Comment, 20 U. Cui. L. Riv. 547,
553 (1953). Others, e.g., 66 STAT. 166, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (e) (2) (1952), might deny substan-
tive due process of law. Compare Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). Moreover,
deportation of a citizen would constitute "punishment" in the constitutional sense. See
United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 264 (1905) (dissent) ; Fong Yue Ting v. Unitcd
States, 149 U.S. 698, 744 (1893) (same); State v. Doughtie, 237 N.C. 434, 74 S.E.2d
925 (1953) (banishment from a state of the Union) ; Ex parte Sheehan, 100 Mont. 244, 49
P.2d 438 (1935) (same); People v. Baum, 251 Mich. 187, 231 N.W. 95 (1930) (same);
Legazda v. Valdez, 1 Phill. 146 (1902) ; Note, 32 N.C.L. REv. 221, 2-2 (1954). It could
therefore be imposed, if at all, only after a trial in which all criminal safeguards were
accorded. See notes 18-22 supra.
139. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISm 266-98 (1951).
"The calamity of the rightless is not that they are deprived of life, liberty, nd the
pursuit of happiness, or of equality before the law and freedom of opinion-formulas
which were designed to solve problems within given communities-but that they no
longer belong to any community whatsoever.
"We became aware of the existence of a right to have rights . . .and a right to
belong to some kind of organized community, only when millions of people emerged
who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global political
situation.
"Not the loss of specific rights, then, but the loss of a community willing and able
to guarantee any rights, whatsoever, has been the calamity which has befallen ever-
increasing numbers of people."
Id. at 293-94. For further discussion of the problems created by statelessness, both for
the individual and for States, see 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 137, 292, 312, 313a
(7th ed., Lauterpacht 1948) ; authorities cited notes 84 supra, 158-62 infra.
140. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) ; Attorney-General
for Canada v. Cain, [1906] A.C. 542; 4 MooRe, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 67, 68
(1906) ; I OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 139, at 631. A State which arbitrarily expels a
foreign national may be liable in damages to the parent State acting in behalf of its
national, id. at 632, but a stateless person has no parent State to represent his interests.
See note 142 infra.
141. The power to exclude aliens is absolute. See Chinese Exclusion Cases, 130 U.S.
581 (1889); 4 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 140, at 67; 1 OeeNnEIVI, op. cit. supra note
139, § 323. While many nations have entered into treaty obligations modifying the power
to exclude, such obligations apply only to nationals of signatory States. See, generally,
Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 171 (1952). Only American citizens or nationals are entitled to
United States passports. Ibid. Often a State may wish to deport a stateless alien but find
it legally impossible because no nation, not even the state of origin, will accept him. The
State will thereupon order the alien to leave its borders within a week on threat of im-
prisonment. This gives the stateless person no choice but to become a fugitive, in either
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port to him, and no State is obliged to admit him without one. 4 1 Moreover,
if a stateless person is a victim of a "denial of justice" by the governmental
authorities of a State, he has no recourse whatever. Under contemporary
international law neither the governments of individual States nor international
organizations are considered to have legal standing to intervene in his behal. 142
In summary, the stateless person has no rights, either intranational or inter-
national, which are inalienable. He exists at the mercy of the State in which
he resides.
1 43
A striking and disturbing feature of expatriation as a punishment is that its
full consequences for the individual are unknowable. Undoubtedly Congress
and state legislatures are constitutionally capable of discriminating against
aliens in ways which have never yet been attenpted.' 44 By tagging the in-
dividual "alien," Congress would impress upon him a kind of permanent guilt,
that State or one of its neighbors, or to embark upon an interminable prison sentence;
he violates the law by remaining alive. See AiENxDr, op. cit. supra note 139, at 220-85;
Abel, Denationalination, 6 MODERN L. Ra.. 57 (1942); Preuss, International Lou, and
Deprivation of Nationali,, 6 GEo. L.J. 250, 273 (1934) ; Williams, Denationalization, 8
Barr. Y.B. IxN'L L. 45, 56 (1927). See also HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LAw 138 (3d cd.
1951); 2 Hunsox, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLTioI 873 (1931); 1 OpPE Nait, op. cit. su pra
note 139, §§ 291,312-13.
142. See 1 OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 139, §§ -91-94, 313; notes lt3-6) infra and
accompanying text. Orthodox theory holds that States alone are subjects of international
law, so that a person without a State to represent his interests is without recourse if he
suffers a "denial of justice" at the hands of the State in which he resides. This help-
lessness of stateless persons under international law makes it "both illogical and offen-
sive to human dignity that International Law should permit a condition of stateless-
ness." 1 OPPEXHEImt, op. cit. supra, § 313a; see LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL L.,W AN xD
HumAN RIGHTS 10-11 (1950) ; Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 63 LQ.
REv. 438 (1947), 64 id. 97 (1948); McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy, 82
Ac D~mI DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COUMS 137 (1953).
143. The REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURAL!-
ZATIOx 241 (1953) recognized the evils produced by statutes creating statelessness. It
recommended full review of American citizenship laws with the objective, inter alia, of
eliminating those leaving persons stateless. In this respect the Report concurred with the
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 15, which declares that "every-
one has a right to a nationality." See notes 84 supra, 158-62 infra for other organizations,
conventions, and commentators which have condemned statelessness.
144. Statutes discriminating against aliens are constitutional if the classification
made is not arbitrary or unreasonable. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410
(1948) ; Clark v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) ; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197
(1923); Comment, 20 U. CL L. REv. 547, 566-69 (1953). However, since the term
"alien" has in the past been assumed to refer to individuals M.th certain factual charac-
teristics, Terrace v. Thompson, supra, at 219; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698, 730 (1893); Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185 (1920); BLACK, Lw
DicorONARY 95 (4th ed. 1951), classifying expatriates as aliens could be attacked as un-
reasonable, and hence violative of equal protection clauses of state constitutions. See note
11 supra. For the suggestion that federal expatriation statutes could not divest state citizen-
ship, see Gathings, Loss of Citi:enship and Civi1 Rights for Conviction of Crime, 43 A.1.
Poi- ScI. REv. 1228 (1949).
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making him subject to additional punishment 14r as imagination and inclination
might subsequently direct. In a sense, expatriation is not itself punishment,
but a blanket authorization of punishment to be specified later. This feature
of the Expatriation Act might alone be sufficient to bring about its invalida-
tion. The Act might thus be considered to violate the ex post facto clause of
the Constitution in that it purports to authorize imposition of punishment in
addition to that imposed by law at the time of commission of the crime.
1'10 It
might in the alternative be considered so vague and indefinite as to deny due
process of law: the accused would be unable, either at the time of engaging in
145. It seems not inaccurate to speak of civil disabilities imposed upon expatriates as
"punishment," since expatriates will lack the factual characteristics of aliens which have
supported holdings that such disabilities have a protective rather than penal function.
See note 144 supra. Moreover, these disabilities will be imposed upon such persons only by
virtue of a penal expatriation statute. See notes 76-100 and accompanying text. Indeed,
the various rationales employed by the Court to hold that deportation of aliens is not
"punishment," and that it may be imposed without regard to substantive provisions of tile
Bill of Rights, all seem inapplicable to expatriates, since those rationales are based on the
assumption that aliens are foreigners who have sought admission to the U.S. from abroad.
Thus, the power to deport is implied from the "sovereign" power over foreign affairs as
a corollary of the power to exclude entering aliens. E.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698 (1893). In holding that deportation is not "punishment," the Court has
either emphasized or assumed that the alien (1) is being sent "home," or at least to a place
no more foreign than the U.S.; (2) knew when he entered the U.S. that he could be de-
ported, and thus to some extent waived the right to protest; (3) continued to be an alien
of his own free will, since he could have become a citizen. The Court has also emphasized
that deportation is a weapon of reprisal in international politics, so that to surround it with
safeguards might impair the government's effectiveness in dealing with other nations. See,
generally, Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587-91 (1952); Galvan v. Press,
347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) ; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, supra, at 711-12; KoNvir/,
THE ALIEN AND THE AsIATic IN ANIERICAN LAW 46-78 (1946). The primary line
of reasoning involved in the holding that substantive constitutional provisions of the
Bill of Rights are inapplicable is that since Congress has absolute power to exclude aliens,
it must have absolute power to expel them. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, supra;
Comment, 20 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 547, 551-56 (1953). Whatever the intrinsic worth of the
above considerations and reasoning, none of them can be used to justify civil deportation
of persons born in the United States and expatriated as punishment for crime. Since the
foreign affairs power would not seem to embrace the power to deport native-born Ameri-
cans who have never left this country, or acquired citizenship in another State, cf. Ex parte
Tadayasu Abo, 76 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1947), reild in part on other grounds, 186
F.2d 775 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 832 (1951), only the power to punish could
sustain deportation of such persons.
Congress appardntly intended the Expatriation Act to deprive the individuals it affects
of whatever constitutional protections they had against civil deportation. See note 18 supra.
The Act in effect punishes the individual by making him subject to the imposition of
further punishment upon a finding of statutory deportability by an administrative tribunal.
If neither expatriation nor deportation is held to constitute cruel and unusual punishment,
this effect of the statute might be upheld by analogy to probation. CI. Giordano v. Walker,
Criminal No. 3927, D. Conn., 1937; Dzssmox, CRimiNAL. LAw, AnMINmsTrArIoN AND
PuBLic ORDER 191, 1033-46 (1948). But see note 125 supra (void-for-vagueness).
146. See note 125 supra.
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the prohibited conduct or during the trial, to estimate accurately the conse-
quences of conviction.Y
4 7
The inherent uncertainty of the consequences of expatriation makes difficult
the process of weighing which is necessary in determining whether the depri-
-vation imposed is disproportionate, either to the seriousness of the offense or
to the benefits derived by the community from its imposition. Thus, nearly all
the concrete ill effects which may flow from expatriation are possible or prob-
able, rather than certain. The individual made a stateless alien may suffer in-
tolerable cruelties, 148 but he may on the other hand lead a relatively normal
life, free of any inconvenience even comparable to a prison sentence. The
benefits to be derived by the State from imposition of this punishment are
similarly uncertain. Since denationalization may not result in any concrete ill
effects for those who suffer it, the example made of such persons will not
necessarily deter others. 4 9 Imposition of this sanction would not necessarily
operate to reform criminals, nor would it necessarily incapacitate them to com-
mit additional crimes. 10 Economy to the State is perhaps the only objective
of punishment which expatriation is certain to serve."" Expatriation might,
of course, have such unpleasant effects as to perform admirably every function
of punishment except reformation, and consequent restoration of the individual
to society.
Since Congress is responsible for the uncertainty of the consequences of
the sanction it chose, and since expatriation affects fundamental human rights,
the possible effects of this sanction should be considered in the light least
favorable to the government.152 In the inquiry whether expatriation is dis-
proportionate to the crime for which it is imposed, the most drastic conse-
quences made legally possibly by expatriation should be balanced against the
147. Ibid.
148. See materials cited notes 139, 141, 143 supra, especially Am,r, T~m Ona nGs
oF TorA Lr is AStS.s 266-98 (1951).
149. Once abroad, the expatriate might not only escape mistreatment but might, by
posing as a martyr or otherwise, advance his cause and injure United States interests more
successfully than he could if he had remained in this country.
The objectives of punishment include example, reformation, incapacitation, satisfaction
to the person injured, and economy to the State. See Belden v. Hugo, 88 Conn. 500, 510,
91 At. 369, 372 (1914) ; Dassio, CRniNAL LAW, ADmINISTRATION ANm PonULIC Onn
54, 192 (1948).
150. Expatriation alone would not prevent continuance of criminal subversive activi-
ties. And deportation would merely shift to another country the burden of guarding against
further criminal activities. Cf. BORCHAR,, DIPLOMATC PROTECTION OF CisZxNs ABoAD
§ 334 (1916).
151. Presumably neither expatriation nor deportation would be as expensive to the
State as imprisonment. If international difficulties arose as a result of deportation of ex-
patriates, see notes 163-66 infra and accompanying text, or if expatriates were able suc-
cessfully to continue anti-American activities abroad, see note 149 supra, even this objective
of punishment might be defeated.
152. See 3 SurERLAND, STATUTORY CoNsTaucriox § 5604 (3d ed., Horack 1943);
Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Peyal Statutes, 48 HARv. L. REv. 748 (1935).
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evil of the least blameworthy conduct which it is used to punish.'" In the
separate inquiry whether this punishment is disproportionate to the value gain
which may be derived by society from its use, only benefits which are sub-
stantially certain to ensue should be considered.
Denationalization might conceivably be considered an overly severe punish-
ment for violation of the Smith Act. Such an argument would emphasize that
expatriation is added to the ten years' imprisonment that may already be
imposed for this offense,15 4 and that mere knowing membership in the Com-
munist Party or "conspiracy to teach" may constitute the crime.11 However,
the courts have traditionally refused to accept the argument that punishments
imposed for seditious activities are excessive.'50 Certainly it could not reason-
ably be contended that denationalization is a penalty disproportionate to the
remaining crimes for which it is presently imposed. If loss of citizenship can
be imposed at all as punishment for crime, it would seem a reasonable penalty
for crimes such as treason, desertion in time of war, rebellion and insurrection,
which have throughout history been deemed worthy of maximum punishment.
The more important eighth amendment question posed by penal expatriation
is not whether it is excessive in amount when imposed for a particular crime,
but whether it is a type of punishment which accomplishes deprivations so
severe, of values so fundamental, as to be an unjustifiable punishment for any
crime. Expatriation, which deprives the individual of all rights against ex-
pulsion from the United States as a stateless alien, seems to fit this description.
Certainly if the eighth amendment constitutes a meaningful limitation on the
power of the federal government to punish, other than as a prohibition of
physical torture, it should be held to forbid the use of expatriation as a punish-
ment.
5 7
153. Cf. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380-81 (1910).
154. 54 STAT. 670 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952).
155. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1950); United States v. Lightfoot,
Criminal No. 54-CR-262, N.D. Ill., Jan. 26, 1955. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1955, p. l, Col.
2; Feb. 16,1955, p. 15, col. 6.
156. See United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 611 n.4 (2d Cir. 1952) (petition
for rehearing) ; cf. Dunne v. United States, 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
790 (1943) (Espionage Act penalties not disproportionate).
157. A distinct rationale for holding that penal expatriation statutes violate the eighth
amendment would be available to a court that was prepared to hold that deportatiot; of
native-born Americans would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. It would seem
axiomatic that if deportation is an unconstitutional punishment, then the Expatriation Act
is unconstitutional to the extent that it purports to authorize it.
Banishment of citizens would be "unusual" and would constitute "punishment." Notes,
32 N.C.L. Rsv. 221, 224 (1954), 44 ILL. L. REv. 106, 107 (1949); cf. Note, 6 S.C.L.Q.
229 (1953). These same conclusions would seem to follow with respect to native-born
expatriates. See notes 127, 138 supra. For dicta to the effect that banishment would be
cruel and unusual, see Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 732, 744, 759 (1893)
(dissent); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 264 (1905) (same); Ng Fung Ho v.
White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) ; but see Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 600
(1.952) (dissent). For denunciation of banishment by international law commentators see
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THE EXPATRIATION ACT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Any general appraisal of the Expatriation Act must take into consideration
the fact that the Act conflicts with clearly formulated policies of the world
community.' 58 Since the 1920's, when statelessness was first recognized as a
world problem, 59 every international conference on nationality has explicitly
condemned legislation which results in the creation of stateless persons.ICO The
recognized treatises are unanimous in their disapproval of statutes which de-
nationalize individuals without regard to whether they possess two nationali-
ties.1' 1 And the Universal Declaration of Human Rights strongly reaffirms the
right of every individual to retain a nationality.'6 2
HUDSON, INTFRXATIO.AL LAW 534 n.8 (3d ed. 1951); Sco, REsoLuTzONs or INSTITCTE
OF IxTERNATioxAL LAw 104 (1917). The REPORT Or THE PREsIDENT'S Cox.IssION oN
-IMMIGRATIoN AND NATJRA.izATION 200 (1953), quoting Judge Augustus Hand, condemns
exile as "a dreadful punishment, abandoned by the common consent uf all civilized peo.ple."
Deportation and expatriation present substantially the same eighth amendment question,
since the danger of expulsion, and its consequences, is by far the most serious consequence
of expatriation.
Because deportation of expatriates may be only a theoretical possibility when the Ex-
patriation Act is tested, see notes 10-11, 45-46 supra, and may depend on difficult questions
of statutory interpretation, see note 11 supra, the courts may be urged to defer decision on
these questions until they arise directly. The Act would be interpreted as divesting the
"rights of nationality," or perhaps those rights of nationality which may constitutionally
be divested. Cf. Comment, 64 YALE L.J. 712, 730-32 (1955). Such an interpretation would
avoid all eighth amendment questions at least until a deportation case arose, and might
result in permanent avoidance of these questions. See United States cx rel. Eichenlaub
v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521 (1950), holding that an individual once held to have lost his
citizenship may raise no special constitutional objections to deportation. Legislative his-
tory should preclude this interpretation however. See note 18 supra.
158. See notes 159-62 infra and accompanying text.
159. Until the first world war there were relatively few stateless persons. The prob-
lem was of little international interest mainly because neither the individuals nor the
States in which they resided had any complaints. Frontiers were easy to cross, passports
and visas were unnecessary. The stateless remained within a State without ill-treatment.
See BRIGGs, THE LAW OF NATIONS 465 (2d ed. 1952). The problem sprang into prominence
with the mass denationalizations carried out by Russia, Germany, Italy, Austria, and Tur-
key after World War I. See Preuss, International Law and Deprivation of Xationality,
23 GEo. L.J. 250 (1934); Holborn, The Legal Status of Political Refugces, 1920-193S,
32 A. J. INT'L L. 680 (1938).
160. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 15; Convention on
Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, signed at The Hague,
April 12, 1930, reprinted in 5 HuDsox, IN.-TERNATo.N-AL LEGisLTion 359 (1936); see
1928 Havana Convention on the Status of Aliens art. 6, reprinted in 4 HuDSON, I.n'm-
NATIoNAL LEGisLATIoN 2374 (1932) ; Report of the 1924 Meeting of the International Law
Association at p. 32, quoted in Abel, Denationaliration, 6 MoDERN L RLv. 57, 63 (1942).
See also Second Report on the Elimination or Reduction of Statclessness, INT;'..AION.AL
LAW Com-issioN, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/75 (Aug. 8, 1953) (mimeograph).
161. E.g., BoRcHARD, DipOLomTic PRoT cTION or CIzENS ABROAD §§ 262, 334 (1916);
FENwicK, INTERNATioNAL LAW 263 (3d ed. 1948); 1 OPPENHEtm, INTERNATIONAL LAW
§§ 313-13a (7th ed., Lauterpacht 1948). See also REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S Cot24IssxoN
ON IMMIGRATION AND NATuRALIzATIox 241-42 (1953) ; A Study of Statlessness, U.N.
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The Expatriation Act would almost undoubtedly be held void under inter-
national law in any dispute where the complaining State could qualify as a
proper party to challenge the Act's validity. 1 3 Such a dispute might arise if
the United States refused to receive denationalized Americans, who had emi-
grated or been deported to another State, on the ground that the Expatriation
Act had terminated American responsibility for such individuals.10 4 But such
a dispute is unlikely to arise. Like many international prescriptions, those
relating to nationality are debilitated by the traditional doctrine that States
alone are the subjects of international law. Under this doctrine only States,
not individuals, have rights under international law,10 and they may protest
Doc. No. E/1112 and addenda (1949); GETrvs, CITIZENSHIP IN TUE UNITED STATES
137-38, 160 (1934) ; SECKLER-HUDSON, STATELESSNESS: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TIUI
UNITED STATES passim (1934) ; Abel, supra note 160, at 63; Preuss, sispra note 159, at 274.
162. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 15, approved by the
United Nations General Assembly in Paris, Dec. 10, 1948. U.N. Doc. A/810, reprinted
in UNESCO, HUMAN RIGHTS, A SYMpOSiUM app. III (1949).
163. Williams, Denationalication, 8 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 45, 52 (1927), reasoned that
it was a violation of international law for a nation to denationalize any person who had
not already obtained a second citizenship. Despite the fact that treatise writers and inter-
-national conventions have always decried the existence of laws, such as the Expatriation
Act, which created stateless persons, see notes 84, 160-61 supra, the courts have general-
ly been unable to make their decisions in accordance with such policies. They have felt
obliged to adhere to the authorities who maintained that questions of nationality were
within the sole jurisdiction of each individual state. United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. 649, 668 (1898); Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees, P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 4
(1923). For citation of cases and comment oi nationality and statelessness, see BmGGS,
THE LAw OF NATIONS 452-66 (2d ed. 1952).
164. "It is surely contrary to principle that a state should in relation to any particular
individual, whether inside or outside its territory, by its own unilateral act free itself from
this obligation . . . to receive back its own nationals." Williams, supra note 163, at 56.
A State has a duty to take back its own nationals or persons whom it has expelled in
the event the nation in which they are residing wishes to deport them. Protocol Concerning
Statelessness, Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality
Laws, signed at The Hague, April 12, 1930, reprinted in 5 HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL
LEaISLATION 387 (1936); ARENDr, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 280-81 & n.36
(1951); BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 161, § 334; HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW 533
(3d ed. 1951) ; 1 OPPENHEIM, op. cit. siupra note 161, §§ 294, 326.
The authorities cited above appear to indicate that the receiving State retains, despite
its acceptance of the stateless deportee or emigrant, the right to demand at a future time
that the State of origin repatriate the individual. The international obligation of a State
to receive back its expellees or nationals would remain unaffected by the passage of in-
ternal legislation which declared the State's responsibility for such persons at an end.
Municipal law cannot be pleaded as a reason for non-compliance with international law.
FENWICK, op. cit. supra note 161, at 89 & n.9. It is doubtful that denationalization prior
to expulsion will be effective to terminate the expelling State's duty to receive back such
persons. See Williams, supra at 56. International law would probably view the individual
as still the responsibility of his native country. See FIELD, OUTLINES OF AN INTERNA-
TIONAL CODE art. 276 (1876) ; ARENDT, op. cit. supra.
165. See Schwarzenberger, The Protection of Human Rights in British State Prac-
tice, 1 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 153 (1948) ; 1 OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 161, §§ 13,
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only violations which injure their own interests. Unless an injury to another
State occurs, through the tie of nationality, a State's treatment of persons
within its borders is considered to be a matter within its "domestic jurisdic-
tion.
' 166
While as a practical matter the Expatriation Act is probably beyond the
reach of the contemporary international law of nationality so far as injury to
the individual is concerned, the use of denationalization as a punishment is
diametrically opposed to the trend of international law towards a greater pro-
tection of human rights.167 This nation has always sought to effect the general
63, 288-92; Idelson, The Law of Nations & The Indiidual 30 TR. s. GorLus Soc'v
50, 54 (1944). Article 34 of the Statute of the International Court uf Justice provides that
"only States maybe parties in cases before the Court." The Amual Report of the Permanent
Court of International Justice prints the summaries of eight typical cases where private
individuals had sought to invoke the court's jurisdiction against a government and had been
refused on grounds that they could not be parties to cases before the Court. 15th Annual Re-
port (1938-39), P.C.IJ., Ser. E, No. 15, at pp. 59-60 (1939). See 1 OPr.XHua, op. cit.
supra, § 291. But the more modern approach is to recognize in addition to States buth in-
dividuals and international organizations as the subjects of international law. LAUTERPACaT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HuhIAN RIGHTS 10-11 (1950) ; Lauterpacht, The Subjeels of the
Law of Nations, 63 L.Q. REv. 438 (1947) ; McDougal, International Law, Powr, and
Policy, 82 ACADMIE DE DROIT INTERNATON AL, RECUEIL DES COUnS 137 (1953); cf. Ad-
visory Opinion of April l1th, 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 181; Jenks, The Legal Personality
of Intentational Organizations, 22 Br. Y.B. I-T'r. L 267 (1945) ; note 149 mipra. On the
subjects of international law generally, see BaiGcs, op. cit. supra note 159, at 65-93 for
commentary and citation of cases.
166. See the Case of the S.S. "Lotus," P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10 (1927); Boac.u.ra,
op. cit. supra note 161, §§ 200, 306-09. The traditional "sovereign" powers of States to
control their own affairs without interference from other nations precludes objection by
another State except where actual injury to the nationals of the complaining State is
threatened or has occurred; a humanitarian interest is not sufficient to undermine the
doctrine of "domestic jurisdiction." See Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees, P.C.I.J.,
Ser. B, No. 4 (1923) (State has exclusive jurisdiction in regard to nationality questions
in its own territory); 1 OPPErHEtX, op. cit. supra note 165, § 140b.
167. For evidence of the increasing international concern for human rights, see e.g.,
United Nations Charter, Preamble, arts. 1(3), 55, 62(2), 68, 76(c), quoted in BruGGs, op.
cit. supra note 159, app. II; United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
proposed Covenant on Human Rights reprinted in 22 DEP'T STATE BULL. 949 (1950) ;
Convention on Genocide, U.N. Doc. A/810, at p. 174 (1948) ; proposed Implementation of
the Principles of the Nuremberg Charter and Trial, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/22 (1950). The
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 15 would make imposition of
the status of statelessness an offense against the law of nations and a matter for inter-
national concern. See 1 OPPz xmE-, IxTERNATiONAL LA.v § 3401 (7th ed., Lauterpacht
1948). Article 15 reaffirms the conclusion reached by the Convention on Certain Ques-
tions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, signed at The Hague, April 12, 1930.
See viote 160 supra. Although the United States has not signed the Declaration, its non-
adherence is not attributable to any widespread disagreement with the principles of human
liberty stated therein, or to a belief that the Declaration would materially increase the
rights and freedoms already guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Rather, it re-
flects the view that the federal government should not utilize the treaty-making power to
deal with matters considered reserved to the states under U.S. CozsT. amend X. Bricker
& NVebb, Treaty Law vs. Domestic Constitutional Law, 29 NomE Dm LA%w. 529,
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betterment of all mankind in the field of human rights. It must then be re-
gretted that the United States, the world's leading proponent of human dignity,
is today engaging in punitive denationalization causing an increase in stateless-
ness, a practice long disfavored by civilized nations, and notoriously identified
with the totalitarian States.108
The existence of a conflict between the Expatriation Act and the dictates
of international law will not directly influence decisions on its constitution-
ality. Under usual doctrines, international law is subordinate to municipal law
in domestic courts. 6 9 In the event of a direct clash between the two, the
courts will follow domestic law, leaving the injured party to claim damages
through the executive branch of the government. 170 Despite these considera-
540 (1954) ; AMERICAN BAR ASsOCIATIoN, REPORT OF COMMITE FOR PEACE AND LAW
THROUGH UNITED NATIONS 21 (1950).
168. "One is almost tempted to measure the degree of totalitarian infection by the
extent to which the concerned governments use their sovereign right to denationalize."
ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISm 277 (1951). See notes 159-60 supra. Au
historical review of the use of denationalization as a punishment by the communist, fascist
and nazi governments can be found in Abel, Denationalization, 6 MODERN L. REV. 57
(1942) ; Preuss, International Law and Deprivation of Nationality, 23 GEO. L.J. 250
(1934). In 1953 all the communist governments had laws which denationalized persons
who lacked loyalty to their governments. See National Legislation Concerning Grounds
for Deprivation of Nationality, International Law Commission, U.N. Doe. No. 4 A/CN,4/ ,
(April 6, 1953) (mimeograph); LAWS CONCERNING NATIONALITY, U.N. Doc. No.
ST/LEG/SER.B/4 (1954).
169. The Supreme Court will uphold domestic legislation in the event of a direct
conflict with a rule of international law. Cunard v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923) ; Head
Money Cases, 1.12 U.S. 580 (1884) ; cf. Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815) (inter-
national law applicable until an act of Congress passed). The indirect effect which inter-
national law may have in the domestic courts is indicated by the decisions of the Supreme
Court in Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ; The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
On the relationship between international law and municipal law, see, generally, FE_-
WICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 90-92 (3d ed. 1948); 1 HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW
24-39 (1940) ; 1 OPPENHE31-, op. cit. supra note 167, §§ 20-25.
170. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ; FENwICm, op. cit. supra note
169, at 87-88. See also COWL.S, TRETIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PROPERTY INTA-
FERENCES AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW 12-14, 178, 301 (1941); Potter, Relative Authority
of International Law and National Law in the United States, 19 A,. J. INT'L L. 315
(1925).
The party injured through the breach of international law may, through the offices of
his State, if he possesses a nationality, claim damages from the injuring State despite the
fact that he was refused redress in the courts of the injuring State. "[A] government can
not appeal to its municipal regulations as an answer to demands for the fulfillment of
international duties. Such regulations may either exceed or fall short of the requirements
of international law, and in either case that law furnishes the test of the nation's liability
and not its own municipal rules." Letter from Secretary of State Bayard to Connery,
[1887] FOREIGN REL U.S. 753 (1887). See also Draft on The Law of Responsibility of
States art. 2, HARVARD RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1.929); BRIGGS, THE LAW
OF NATIONS 62, 889 (2d ed. 1952) (comment and bibliography); FENWICK, op, cit. supra,
at 89& n.9.
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tions, the fact that laws which breed statelessness have been condemned by the
United Nations and decried by the major States of the world should influence
the courts to deny such laws the benefit of any constitutional doubts.1 7 1 These
factors are even more powerful as policy reasons why Congress should re-
examine the advisability of the Expatriation Act. If the threat of subversion
can be met adequately by imposition of conventional sanctions, it would seem
to be in the best interests of the United States and anti-communism to abstain
from the use of denationalization as a punishment, and thereby to accord with
the trend in international law towards greater solicitude for human dignity.
CONCLUSION
The Expatriation Act is a bold attempt to utilize congressional powers of
expatriation in order to denationalize Americans who have performed acts of
disloyalty. As such it presents solid issues for constitutional debate. Foremost
among the arguments for constitutionality will be the subtle and persuasive
one which classifies loss of nationality under the Act as voluntary expatriation.
Congress has designated certain subversive crimes as acts of expatriation, so
this self-contained argument runs, and, by definition, the citizen who performs
one of these acts voluntarily expatriates himself. By accepting this rationale,
a court may uphold both the Expatriation Act and the traditional ban on with-
drawal of nationality without the citizen's consent.
As the investigation into constitutionality proceeds fqrther, it should be
apparent that voluntary expatriation is a faqade which camouflages the fact
that denationalization is used as a punishment for subversive activities. Viewed
in this way, the act raises issues concerning the existence of congressional
power and the constitutional limitations upon its exercise. The traditional
view that the Constitution grants to Congress no power to impose expatriation
appears upon examination to be erroneous. The foreign affairs power with
respect to dual nationality statutes, and the power to employ all means "neces-
sary and proper for carrying into Execution [granted] ... Powers" with re-
spect to penal expatriation statutes, appear to authorize use of denationaliza-
tion provided no explicit constitutional limitations are thereby infringed.
The conclusion that the Act imposes denationalization as a punishment for
crime would lead the courts into unexplored constitutional territory, for Con-
gress has seldom if ever used any but the traditional means of punishment.
And while the Expatriation Act may encounter serious difficulty with other
sections of the Constitution, the only constitutional provision which expressly
limits the government's power to punish is the eighth amendment's seldom
171. Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the Supreme Court in Murray v. The Charm-
ing Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804), declared that "an act of Congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction re-
mains... .. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) ("international law is a part
of our law") ; Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 38S (1815). See also Baxcs, op. cit. Mspra
note 170, at 62; Jenks, The Authority in English Courts of Decisions of the Permanent
Court of International Justice, 18 Br. Y.B. Irf. L. 1 (1938).
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used prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. The Act transforms the
citizen into a stateless person, having only the rights of an alien under the
Constitution and laws of the United States and other nations, and with no
recourse under contemporary international law against maltreatment by any
State. This status of statelessness, with its ever-present liability to deporta-
tion, should be deemed in modern context to constitute a cruel and unusual
punishment.
Whether or not the Act is held constitutional, two factors suggest that Con-
gress reconsider the advisability of the legislation. First, the Act conflicts with
sound international policy. Second, the Expatriation Act largely duplicates
other laws which now protect the United States against subversion. 172 Analysis
of the public benefits derived, and human values destroyed, by use of expatria-
tion as a punishment suggests that this sanction is inefficient-that the Act
was not a sober response to the demands of national policy,173 but rather was
enacted primarily to vent the nation's hatred of citizens who have forsaken
their native country by adopting communism. Actually, democracy and anti-
communism would be better strengthened by repeal of the Expatriation Act
and reliance upon conventional sanctions to deter and punish subversion.
172. See statutes cited notes 2, 4 supra.
173. Total debate on the Expatriation Act in both the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives covered less than six pages of the Congressional Record. 100 CONG. Rrc.
11279-83, 14930, 14981, 14983, 15235 (1955). The bill was introduced in the House on July
19, 1954, id. at 10975, and passed on July 21, 1954, id. at 11283. It was reported to the
Senate on August 2, 1955, id. at 13003, and passed on August 18, 1955, id. at 14983. The
House concurred in the amended version of the bill on August 19, 1955. Id. at 15235.
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